

1968/9

Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.  
*Reg P O'sborne*  
Date 30/10/70

YEAR  
STAMP

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

DEPT

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. **NE Q 10/1** (66 & 106)  
(Part B.)

TITLE: *Sale of aircraft and associated  
Equipment to the Iraqi Government.*

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Reg.		29/7	<del>PH. x</del>	<del>x</del>	24/10	P.H.	97-	10/3
P.H.		24/7	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	21/11	<del>Regy</del>		
AAA	W 66	29/7	<del>PH</del>	<del>(89)</del>	21/4			
M Tripp	W 66	25/4/8	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	21/4			
P.H.	68/69	11/8	<del>PH</del>	<del>(89)</del>	24/11			
Reg		14/8	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
J.P.T.			<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
Reg			<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
P.H.	(71)	19/11	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
M. Statham DTSD	(71)	26/12	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
PH	(71)	28/8	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
Regy		5/9	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
P.H.		4/11	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
Regy		13/10	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
P.H.		13/10	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
Regy		14/10	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
PH DTSD	(79)	17/10	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
Regy		17/10	<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			
PH	(88)		<del>Regy</del>	<del>(89)</del>	25/11			

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FILE No. **NE Q 10/1** PART **B.**

YEAR STAMP

1968/9



AM. 24/7 (66)

ROUTINE: STOW 20 DATE 25.7.69  
TO: PROGRAMME BAHAD  
FROM: AIR ATTACHE  
FROM: NINTEN, AIR 2A LONDON  
RECEIVED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 29 JUL 1969 NEQ 10/1
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High diff

CARTRIDGES FOR Hunter PECTOR SENTS

See f 60-63.

1. WILL REPLY IN GENERAL LATER.
2. PARAS. 6 AND 7. HAVE HAD NO REPLY FROM IAF SINCE <sup>(IAF)</sup> THE CARTRIDGES OFFERED. WROTE TO IRAQI AA ON 19TH JUNE AND TELEPHONED HASTEN ON 30D JULY. WAS ADVISED OFFER HAD BEEN REFERRED TO BAHAD FOR APPROVAL TO PLACE ORDER AND THEY WOULD COME IF THEY REQUESTED THEM.
3. NOTHING MORE HEARD. <sup>(difficult)</sup> VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTACT IRAQI AIR ATTACHE WHO INVARIABLY EITHER DOES NOT ANSWER PHONE OR HIS SECRETARY SAYS HE AND RELEVANT ASSISTANT ARE AWAY. MANAGED ON 29TH JULY TO CONTACT MR. SHAKI AT IRAQI EMBASSY: STILL NOW HEARS.
4. HAVE ADVISED EMBASSY VERBALLY AND BY LETTER WE MUST LIFT THE RESERVATION ON THESE CARTRIDGES IF NO ORDER RECEIVED BY END NEXT WEEK. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THESE ITEMS IN SHORT SUPPLY AND IF IRAQIS DO NOT WANT, OTHER COUNTRIES DO. ALSO ITEM HAS RESTRICTED LIFE AND IF WE HOLD TOO LONG AGAINST IRAQI REQUEST AND THEY DO NOT ORDER WE MAY BE LEFT WITH LIABILITY OF LIFE EXPIRED BATCH OF CARTRIDGES.
5. TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF FRUSTRATIONS WE AND AIRCRAFT COMPANIES EXPERIENCE WITH IAF. DOES NOT ENCOURAGE THOSE CONCERNED TO BE CO-OPERATIVE.

CHIC:- AIR 2A  
INFO:- US/AIR  
AS/AIR 2  
AIR 1A  
DS 8 (AIR) MD  
FOO DED  
FOO Arabian Dept.  
423  
FILE NO:- ME/22/04

Reg. 24. 66.  
PUM//  
29/7



Mr. Acland

Folio 66, taken together with folios 60 <sup>4</sup> and 63 in part A of the attached file, is a classic example of Whitehall being urged into frantic activity by our Embassy in Baghdad and our efforts subsequently, proving to be abortive and indeed unnecessary.

2. Paragraph 5 of folio 66, last sentence, sums it all up very neatly.

3. Mr. Tripp may wish to mention this type of frustrating and non-productive exercise (the Iraqi floods saga is another example) to Mr. Balfour Paul when H.M. Ambassador Designate in Baghdad calls on the Department on 15 August.



(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
29 July, 1969

And visits which don't come off.  
You should see these papers, which, though not important in themselves, give a very good example of the difficulties in dealing with the Iraqis. They overstate their case, & the importance & urgency of it. Not always unreasonably, H.M. Embassy backs them up in the interests of good relations. We & other departments try to provide a quick & forthcoming response. This is obtained; the Embassy & the Iraqis are informed & then ..... nothing happens.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

A.A. Acland  
29/7

in Tripp  
30.7

800 mtd.

14 August

Issued

148



NEQ 10/1

Reg pa  
from

67

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
31 JULY 1969

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TELNO. STOW 27 310545Z JUL 69.

FOR EIR 2A. REFERENCE YOUR TEL STOW 29 DATED  
25 JULY. IRAQI AIR FORCE PASSED FOLLOWING ORDER TO AA  
LONDON ON 20 JULY TO BE PASSED TO YOU. REQUIRE ERU  
CARTRIDGES NO. 1, MK 3, REF 12K/1411 QUANTITY  
100 PRICE £4284 15S. 0D. INDENT NO. 1969/AIR/167  
DATED 20 JULY 1969 REFERRING TO INDENT NO9 HU/423/03.  
DATED 19 JUNE 1969.

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

**ADVANCE COPIES SENT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EIR 24  
HSEIR  
HS/EIRZ  
EIR 1A  
~~JR 8 (A) HED~~  
FCO - DTD  
FCO - Graham Del.  
File  
HU/H23/OI.



(68)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
71 AUG 1969  
NEQ 10/1

ROUTINE: STOW 30 SENT 3.7.69

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM: KIR 1(A) MINTECH

CONFIDENTIAL

(63)

YOUR STOW 25. SUBJECT: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

RAF HUNTERS AVAILABILITY IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW IN M.O.D. AND THIS EXERCISE IS UNLIKELY TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE NOVEMBER. EVEN THEN VERY FEW WILL BE AVAILABLE AND OTHER CUSTOMERS HAVE ALREADY MADE KNOWN THEIR REQUIREMENT. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT AN IRAQI REQUIREMENT WOULD NOT BE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION AT THE TIME.

U.S.A. ARE HOWEVER CURRENTLY OFFERING EX RAF HUNTER MK.4 AIRCRAFT FOR CONVERSION TO MK.9 STANDARD AND HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED SOME ORDERS FOR THESE. DETAILS AS FOLLOWS.

TWELVE AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE FOR CONVERSION WITH DELIVERY COMMENCING AT ABOUT EIGHTEEN MONTHS FROM DATE OF CONTRACT. BROAD PRICES ARE £225,000 FOR CONVERSION OF MK.4 TO MK.9 AND £275,000 FOR CONVERSION OF MK.4 TO MK.269. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS.

ORIG:- KIR 1(A)

INFO:- US/KIR MINTECH

AS/KIR

KIR 1(G)

D.T.S.D. F.C.O.

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT - F.C.O.

FILE NO:- AP/13/01

Pa 11/11/69

1/8



CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 28

5 AUGUST 1969.

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 6 AUG 1969 NEQ 10/1
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FOR EIR 1(A). SUBJECT, HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.  
REF YOUR TELNO STOW 30 OF 31 JULY, REQUEST CLARIFICATION  
ON FOLLOWING TWO POINTS.

1. ARE THERE IN FACT TWELVE HUNTERS AVAILABLE TO IAF OR HAS HSA ALREADY RECEIVED ORDERS FOR A QUANTITY OF THAT FIGURE..
2. ARE THE PRICES QUOTED THE COMPLETE SALES PRICES OR PRICE OF CONVERSION ONLY.

MR. HAWLEY

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D.T.S. DEPARTMENT

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*How to handle*

*PM*

*6/8*

*pa. (see min.)*



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Reference.....

NFA 10/1

4.69

Mr. Acland

Hunters for Iraq

FLAG H

Mr. Tripp has commented on Baghdad telegram Stow 28 "Are we selling Hunters to Iraq?". The position is as follows:-

FLAG I.

2. The Iraqis have been asking our Embassy in Baghdad if there are any Hunters available. It is thought that they are almost certainly referring to Mark 9 or Mark 6 Hunters still in service with the R.A.F. - only a very few of which will be available for export and ~~for that~~ there is a long waiting list. As you will see from Tel. Stow 30 to Baghdad the position about the availability of R.A.F. Hunters will not be known until November.

3. Hawkers however have a stock of old Mark 4 Hunters which can be expensively converted to Mark 9 standard in about 18 months from date of contract but it remains to be seen if the Iraqis are interested in paying such high prices. This is the type of Hunter which was recently turned down by Abu Dhabi. However the details of price and delivery will be told to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence in Baghdad - without, of course, commitment to supply on our part at this stage.

4. If the Iraqis do wish to order converted Mark 4 Hunters (and this is thought to be improbable) we will need to submit to Ministers but I would have thought in view of recent developments in Iraq that we would be able to agree to the supply of these aircraft (a maximum of 12 are involved and we have provided the Iraqis with 52 in the past including some Mark 6s) unless of course the "Israeli Angle" is thought to be an overriding consideration in this case.

*P.R.M. Hinchcliffe*

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
7 August 1969

c.c. Mr

Stebbins

DT.50

I doubt if the Iraqis will want Mark 4 Hunters. If they show real interest, I agree with Mr Hinchcliffe that we could probably permit this sale; but we shall have to look at it very carefully at the time.

*Mr Tripp*

CONFIDENTIAL

*A. Acland*

And bear in mind the claims of other Arab countries e.g. Jordan, if he is still interested.

*Mr Hinchcliffe* 8/8

*J.P. [unclear]* 8.8

*PQ*  
*[unclear]*  
*8/8*



ROUTING STOW 32 DATE 7.2.69

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM: AIR 142 MINTEN

RESTRICTED

Reg

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 8 AUG 1969
NEQ 10/1

6/2

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70

YOUR STOW 28. HUNTERS FOR IRAQ. CONFIRMATION REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS:-

- (1) TWELVE HUNTERS MK. 4, A.F., MK. 4 AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE EXCEPT AVAILABLE TO FIRST CUSTOMER FOR CONVERSION TO MK. 9 OR MK. T 69.
- (2) PRICES QUOTED ARE COMPLETE SALES PRICES.

GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE ON IRAQI AIR FORCE INTEREST IN HAWKERS OFFER AS THE QUESTION OF SUPPLY WILL NEED TO BE CLEARED THIS MND.

IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE MK. 4 HUNTERS WOULD BE CONVERTED TO FULL MK. 9 STANDARD.

ORIG:- AIR 14 - STOW 32

INFO:- US/AIR

AS/AIR

AIR 1(6)

D.T.S.D. - F.C.O.

NEAR EAST DEPARTMENT, F.C.O.



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REGISTRY No. 10  
14 AUG 1969  
NEQ 10/11

Extract from the Minutes of the Arms Working  
Party Meeting - AWP/M(69)6 of 23 July 1969.

5. ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

(Mintech letter AP/32/021, AP/77/05, AP/130/058 dated 3rd June, 1969  
to Head of DS13)

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In his letter of 3rd June Mr. Benjamin said that General Tikriti had expressed interest in acquiring some £130M worth of aero-space equipment including Lightnings, Jaguars, BAC167s, radar and communications equipment and Rapier, but had indicated that he would require some expression of HMG's goodwill - probably in the form of pressure on the IPC to settle terms more favourable to Iraq - as a precondition to placing any firm orders.

MR. BENJAMIN said that, while BAC appreciated there were difficulties, they would like to know which items HMG would be prepared to supply in order to plan a sales campaign. The Lightning production line was dying and an order in the near future was needed to avert this. On this item, therefore, BAC were pressing for an answer. In reply to a question from THE CHAIRMAN, MR. BENJAMIN agreed that the Air Force Department were opposed to the sale of Lightnings to Iraq, but said that the Iraqis could easily acquire the AS23 or Mirage which were just as sophisticated. The French were still active on the sidelines and this was another reason why it was essential for HMG to create a reasonable atmosphere. It was also essential for BAC to have a clear policy for both Iraq and Iran.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether it would be worthwhile to submit a list to the Strategic Exports (Official) Committee but MR. BENJAMIN said that two previous submissions had been met with a request for resubmission when orders became firmer.

MR. BENJAMIN further agreed that the sale of Lightnings would almost certainly entail the subsequent supply of Red Top, but the missiles would not be delivered until long after Red Top had been acquired by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and there seemed to be no good reason why the supply of a modified version to Iraq should be opposed. He also advised THE CHAIRMAN that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had been asked for an up-to-date assessment of Iraq but that it was difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion. All he wanted was an agreed list of alternatives which could be offered to Iraq in place of the items they had specified, e.g., Lightning and Harrier in place of Jaguar and Tigercat in place of Rapier.

MISS COTSFORD said there were unclassified radars which could also be offered.

It was agreed that THE CHAIRMAN and MR. BENJAMIN should formulate an approach and draw up a list. MR. CHAIRMAN agreed to reply to MR. BENJAMIN's letter on these lines.

THE WORKING PARTY:-

NOTED

Pa PMA 20/8

Thanks - I sent  
the letter to you

Mr Stenham to see  
then return to me

26/8

CONFIDENTIAL

PMA

19/8



3 - SEP 1969

Cutting dated ..... 19

THE INDEPENDENT  
NEWSPAPER

**OPINION**

**NOW END  
THIS  
BAN!**

**N**OTHING could be more preposterous than the projected sale of British jet-fighters and anti-aircraft missiles to Iraq. The deal will be worth up to £100 million. But anything more calculated to inflame the smouldering enmities of the Middle East is hard to imagine.

Israel will obviously want to balance up on this kind of armoury to an Arab country.

But more important to the British people is the Government's whole policy on arms deals.

At the moment it appears that practically any nation in the world can come to Britain shopping for arms—provided it can afford them. With one exception—South Africa.

**SOUTH AFRICA** wanted British arms. And would still prefer to buy British.


She is a vital link in our communications and sea routes in the South Atlantic. Royal Navy ships regularly use her ports.

South Africa is a friend!

So proper and adequate defence of South Africa is vital to Britain.

Yet Mr. Wilson still maintains his foolish ban—a ban which has cost Britain more than £200 million.

To supply sophisticated weapons to Iraq, a far from friendly nation, and to refuse South Africa's custom plainly underlines the double standards in diplomacy applied by the Wilson Administration.



W. 72

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Reg 5/1

4/9



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72  
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DAILY EXPRESS

3 - SEP 1969

Cutting dated ..... 19

# Britain in £100 million jets deal with Iraq

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

**T**HE British Aircraft Corporation is negotiating to sell Iraq Lightning jet-fighters and Red Top guided anti-aircraft missiles worth up to £100 million.

Secret talks have been in progress in London and Bagdad for several months with full backing from the Government's Arms Sales department and the Foreign Office.

I understand that Saudi Arabia, which is already buying Lightnings, has agreed to delay the latter part of that order so that Iraq can have early delivery of planes for training.


## AND NOW -

The proposed new deal is certain to lead to a demand from Labour M.P.s for a complete review of the Government's arms sales policy in the Middle East.

Iraq has announced recognition of the new revolutionary military régime in Libya. The military rulers could eventually steer Libya into an alignment with Iraq and Syria aimed against Israel.

Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, has assured M.P.s that the British Chieftain tanks and self-propelled guns being sold to Libya are for purely defensive purposes. But there are no political strings to prevent their use outside Libya.

Reg  
BMM  
4/9





S E C R E T

(72)

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 35

11 OCTOBER 1969

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 13 OCT 1969 <i>NFO 10/1</i>
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SECRET.

EIR FOR CHRISTIE. GENERAL GHENSHAL ADAMANT THAT DURING WASH-UP CONFERENCE 30 APRIL YOU PERSONALLY GAVE 1971 AS DELIVERY DATE FOR JAGUAR SPECIFICALLY TO IRAQ. IF MINIMUM OF ONE SQUADRON CAN BE DELIVERED IN 1971 IRAQ WISH TO PURCHASE. REQUIRE TO KNOW HOW MANY AIRCRAFT COULD BE DELIVERED IN 1971 EARLIEST DELIVERY DATE AND RATE OF DELIVERY. ALSO REQUIRE PRICE DETAILS. REPLY NEEDED URGENTLY. POINTEDLY ADVISED THAT FRENCH ARE NOT BEING CONSULTED. SATISFACTORY<sup>R</sup> REPLY<sup>A</sup> WOULD LEAD TO REQUIREMENT FOR B.A.C. TO VISIT IRAQ TO DISCUSS DETAIL. IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE JAGUAR WAS ALSO EXPRESSED BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO HBM AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING.

MR. BALFOUR-PAUL

[SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINTECH DUTY OFFICER]

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S E C R E T

GGGGG

*This is being checked  
and letter Fco. minister  
(mod)*

*PM*

15/10



(73)

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY TEHRAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 779

4 SEPTEMBER 1969

[RECEIVED WITHOUT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]



Addressed to F.C.O. Tel. No. 779 of 4 September, repeated for information to Baghdad.

Arms for Iraq.

Today's papers here give some prominence to Reuters' report of Chapman Pincher's article in Tuesday's Daily Express about secret talks which have allegedly been in progress in London and Baghdad for several months with full British official backing on the sale of Lightnings and Red Top guided anti aircraft missiles worth up to £100 million to Iraq. We are likely to be questioned on this. Grateful for guidance. In particular, is there anything to add to the information contained in your Tel. No. 398?

NEQ 10/4

F.C.O. pass Baghdad.

SIR D. WRIGHT

Reply sent  
now rec (76)  
f.

[Repeated as requested]

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Def.T.& S.D.  
Arab.D.  
News D.  
Guid.D.

PM  
8/9

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DDDDD



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Mr. Graham

Lightnings for Iraq

... You asked Mr. Hinchcliffe for a draft letter to Mr. Youde setting out the history of Iraqi interest in Lightnings. This is now attached.

... 2. Chapman Pincher's article together with the Daily Express editorial of 3 September are also attached at Flag A.  
...

*A.A. Acland*

(A. A. Acland)

*Dft to issue. Pl give no estimate of*

c.c. Mr. Arthur

*49*

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Registry  
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**DRAFT**

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

☐ Top Secret.  
☐ Secret.  
☐ Confidential.  
☐ Restricted.  
☐ Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

To:—

E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.

From

J.A.N, Graham  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

You asked ~~recently~~ about Chapman Pincher's article in the "Daily Express" of 3 September on the alleged £100 million deal with Iraq for the sale of Lightning aircraft.

2. The background to this is that the Iraqis, during the past five years, have shown an intermittent interest in buying Lightnings. In August 1965 the Ministerial Committee on Strategic Exports approved, with the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff, the export of 40 Mk.3 and 4 Mk.5 Lightnings to Iraq, provided that the accompanying equipment was not more advanced than the Firestreak Missile and A.I.23 radar. However for various reasons the order never materialised - mainly, we suspect, because the Iraqis were then, as more recently, simultaneously negotiating for French and Russian aircraft.

3. The Iraqi interest in buying Lightnings looked like crystallising once more in late 1967 and early 1968. The British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) then put forward proposals to supply 48 Lightnings Mk.53 and 4 Mk.55 trainer aircraft, together with supporting equipment including the Red Top Air to Air Missile. This proposal was considered by the Strategic Exports (Official) Committee in the light of the policy on arms supplies to the Middle East as laid down by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee in November 1967

(the paper...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Letter dispatched to  
Secretary's Dept.  
- 4 SEP 1969



(the paper which the Committee considered at that time had envisaged the possible supply of Lightnings to Middle Eastern countries even though other aircraft such as heavy bombers were to be proscribed). The Official Committee concluded that in view of the general situation then prevailing in the Middle East it would not be desirable to take a final decision on the supply of Lightnings to Iraq, but decided that Ministers should be informed of the situation and that in the meanwhile BAC should continue their negotiations (which would not commit H.M.G. in any way) with a view to establishing the genuineness of the Iraqi interest. Accordingly, the Ministerial Committee was informed of the position (ESC(68)3 of 8 April 1968) and there was no objection to the proposition that BAC should continue the negotiations.

4. Since then the Iraqis have continued to show an erratic interest in Lightnings. In early January this year it looked as if an order would be placed for this aircraft plus Red Top (the total order ~~was~~ valued by BAC at £50m-£100m) and preparations were made to refer the matter to Ministers. Once again, however, the negotiations with BAC came to nothing and although discussions between the Company and the Iraqis have continued off and on since then, the indications now are that the Iraqis are no longer seriously interested.

5. It may be worth adding that this story of Iraqi interest in the Lightning is typical of Iraqi "arms shopping" in this country and probably elsewhere as well. They display interest from time to time in all sorts of defence equipment and on occasions appear to be at the point of placing firm orders. For example, it was  
/agreed...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



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agreed at ministerial level earlier this year that the obsolete Tigercat ground to air missile could be sold to them, but in the event the Iraqis displayed no further interest. They also tend to attach conditions to their prospective arms orders. For instance, the Iraqi Minister of Defence made it clear last winter that an Iraqi order for defence equipment (including Lightnings) would only be forthcoming if HMG intervened (by implication on the Iraqi side) in their dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

6. You will see from all this that Chapman Pincher's article contains an element of truth. There is however no "new deal" and in our view little likelihood of the Iraqis placing a firm order for Lightnings. If BAC do <sup>receive</sup> ~~see~~, after all, a specific request for the supply of these (or other) aircraft it will be referred, as necessary, to Ministers ~~to be considered by the O.P.D.~~ in accordance with established practice.

49.

confidential

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL

(75)

leg sk  
HMM  
4/9

4 September, 1969

NEQ 10/1

(72)

You asked about Chapman Pincher's article in the "Daily Express" of 3 September on the alleged £100 million deal with Iraq for the sale of Lightning aircraft.

The background to this is that the Iraqis, during the past five years, have shown an intermittent interest in buying Lightnings. In August 1965 the Ministerial Committee on Strategic Exports approved, with the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff, the export of 40 Mk.3 and 4 Mk.5 Lightnings to Iraq, provided that the accompanying equipment was not more advanced than the Firestreak Missile and A.I.23 radar. However for various reasons the order never materialised - mainly, we suspect, because the Iraqis were then, as more recently, simultaneously negotiating for French and Russian aircraft.

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/the Committee

E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,  
10 Downing Street.

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the Committee considered at that time had envisaged the possible supply of Lightnings to Middle Eastern countries even though other aircraft such as heavy bombers were to be proscribed). The Official Committee concluded that in view of the general situation then prevailing in the Middle East it would not be desirable to take a final decision on the supply of Lightnings to Iraq, but decided that Ministers should be informed of the situation and that in the meanwhile BAC should continue their negotiations (which would not commit Her Majesty's Government in any way) with a view to establishing the genuineness of the Iraqi interest. Accordingly, the Ministerial Committee was informed of the position (ESC(68)3 of 8 April 1968) and there was no objection to the proposition that BAC should continue the negotiations.

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It may be worth adding that this story of Iraqi interest in the Lightning is typical of Iraqi "arms shopping" in this country and probably elsewhere as well. They display interest from time to time in all sorts of defence equipment and on occasions appear to be at the point of placing firm orders. For example, it was agreed at ministerial level earlier this year that the obsolete Tigercat ground to air missile could be

/sold

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sold to them, but in the event the Iraqis displayed no further interest. They also tend to attach conditions to their prospective arms orders. For instance, the Iraqi Minister of Defence made it clear last winter that an Iraqi order for defence equipment (including Lightnings) would only be forthcoming if Her Majesty's Government intervened (by implication on the Iraqi side) in their dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

You will see from all this that Chapman Pincher's article contains an element of truth. There is however no "new deal" and in our view little likelihood of the Iraqis placing a firm order for Lightnings. If BAC do receive, after all, a specific request for the supply of these (or other) aircraft it will be referred, as necessary, to Ministers in accordance with established practice.

(Sd.) N. J. Barrington

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CYPHER/CAT A &amp; BY BAG

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PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO TEHRAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 547

5 SEPTEMBER 1969

(NEQ) 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

73  
ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 547 OF 5 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, BEIRUT, AMMAN AND CAIRO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

72  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 779 OF 4 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL).

PINCHER'S ARTICLE IN DAILY EXPRESS (3 SEPTEMBER) ON SALE OF LIGHTNINGS TO IRAQ.

2. PINCHER HAS PROBABLY BEEN SITTING ON THIS STORY FOR SOME MONTHS.

3. CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BAC HAVE BEEN GOING ON SPASMODICALLY SINCE 1965. MINISTERS, IN APRIL 1968, SAW NO OBJECTION TO BAC'S CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS (WITHOUT COMMITTING HMG IN ANY WAY) IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE GENUINENESS OF OF IRAQ'S INTEREST. IN THE EVENT IRAQI ENTHUSIASM (ALSO DISPLAYED FOR RUSSIAN AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT) WANED AND WE DO NOT THINK THAT THEY ARE NOW SERIOUSLY INTERESTED. EVEN BAC, WHO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY OPTIMISTIC, FEEL THAT THIS SCENT HAS BEEN COLD FOR SOME MONTHS.

4. SHOULD BAC RECEIVE, AFTER ALL, A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR THE SUPPLY OF THESE (OR OTHER) AIRCRAFT YOU AND OTHER POSTS CONCERNED WILL BE CONSULTED BEFORE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN.

5. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE ON THE RECORD MAINTAINED THEIR USUAL LINE THAT IT IS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO COMMENT ON QUESTIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE SALES OF ARMS ABROAD. THEY HAVE HOWEVER EXPLAINED TO TRUSTED CONTACTS ONLY (ON A QUOTE NO SOURCE UNQUOTE BASIS) THAT ARAB COUNTRIES (AND IRAQ IN PARTICULAR) ARE ALWAYS, WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INTEREST, SHOPPING AROUND FOR ARMS AND MAKING CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES WHICH MORE OFTEN THAN NOT COME TO NOTHING. IT IS OF COURSE QUITE POSSIBLE THAT BAC HAVE BEEN APPROACHED (BAC, UNDER PRESSURE, HAVE CONFIRMED HAVING CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS). HMG ARE ONLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ARE

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/APPROACHING



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-2-

APPROACHING THE POINT AT WHICH AN EXPORT LICENCE MAY BE SOUGHT. THIS POINT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED IN THIS INSTANCE.

6. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION DRAW ON THE MATERIAL IN PARAGRAPH 5 WHEN SPEAKING TO RELIABLE CONTACTS AND COULD ADD THAT IF AN EXPORT LICENCE IS SOUGHT FOR THIS OR SIMILAR EQUIPMENT HMG WILL CONSIDER THE APPLICATION IN THE LIGHT OF OUR ARMS POLICY AND OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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D.T.S.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. D.

NEWS D.

GUIDANCE D.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No. **BA** NEQ  
DEPARTMENT  
Near Eastern

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~  
Priority  
~~Standard~~

(Date) 5/9  
1234

Despatched

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PRIVACY MARKING

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CONFIDENTIAL

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~~Code~~  
Cypher

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

CYPHER

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to TEHRAN

telegram No. 547 (date) 5/9/69

~~And to~~

repeated for information to BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, JEDDA,  
BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO.

Saving to UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

Your telegram No. 779 [of 4 September] (not to all). Pincher's article in Daily Express (3 September) on sale of Lightnings to Iraq.

2. Pincher has probably been sitting on this story for some months.

3. Contacts between Iraq and BAC have been going on spasmodically since 1965. Ministers, in April 1968, saw no objection to BAC's continuing discussions (without committing HMG in any way) in order to establish the genuineness of Iraq's interest. In the event Iraqi enthusiasm (also displayed for Russian and French aircraft) waned and we do not think that they are now seriously interested. Even BAC, who have been consistently optimistic, feel that this scent has been cold for some months.

4. Should BAC receive, after all, a specific request for the supply of these (or other) aircraft

/you

Draft Telegram to:—

• TEHRAN

No. 547

(Date) 5/9

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Baghdad  
Kuwait  
Bahrain  
Jedda  
Beirut  
Amman  
Cairo

Saving to:—

UKMIS New York  
Washington

[Agreed with  
News Dept.]  
7/9/69

Distribution:—  
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NED  
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ARABIAN  
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Copies to:—

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

5/9/69  
10052  
5/9/69



you and other posts concerned will be consulted before decisions are taken.

5. In reply to questions, News Department have on the record maintained their usual line that it is not our practice to comment on questions about possible sales of arms abroad. They have however explained to trusted contacts only (on a <sup>"no source"</sup> ~~"no source"~~ basis) that Arab countries (and <sup>Iraq</sup> ~~IRAQ~~ in particular) are always, with varying degrees of interest, shopping around for arms and making contacts with individual companies which more often than not come to nothing. It is of course quite possible that BAC have been approached (BAC, under pressure, have confirmed having contacts with the Iraqis). HMG are only directly involved when negotiations are approaching the point at which an export licence may be sought. This point has not been reached in this instance.

6. You may at your discretion draw on the material in paragraph 5 when speaking to reliable contacts and could add that if an export licence is sought for this or similar equipment HMG will consider the application in the light of <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ arms policy and ~~in~~ <sup>view</sup> of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

 5/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



4 SEP 1969

Cutting dated

....., 19

# 'BAC talks with Iraq on Lightnings' refuted

BY MICHAEL DONNE, AEROSPACE CORRESPONDENT

SUGGESTIONS that the British Aircraft Corporation is currently engaged in negotiations with Iraq over the possible sale to it of Lightning jet fighters were refuted in London yesterday.

The BAC, as a commercial organisation, in recent years has discussed the possibility of sales of its products with a number of countries in the Middle East—including, it is believed, with Iraq some time ago. At present, so far as Iraq is concerned, the matter is understood to be "cold," with no negotiations in progress.

Suggestions that Saudi Arabia might forgo some of its own Lightning deliveries in favour of Iraq are also dismissed. Saudi Arabia has, in fact, now taken delivery of most of its Lightnings, with the few remaining for delivery due to be handed over very soon.

## Comment lacking

Richard Johns writes: There was no reaction from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence yesterday which, as a matter of policy, will not comment on arms sales abroad. The Iraqi Embassy


also refused to say whether the report was correct.

In diplomatic circles it was felt that Iraq may have made approach of some sort (representatives of the Baghdad regime are well known for talking about arms supplies at the slightest opportunity), but these are hardly likely to have amounted to serious contacts, let alone negotiations.

Iraq was reported a year ago by the Institute of Strategic Studies to have some 60 Soviet MiG-21 interceptors out of a total combat air strength of 215. If anything, this number will have increased and the main military requirement would seem to be for modern ground-attack aircraft to replace ageing Hunters.

The Lightning, even in the dual role produced for Saudi Arabia, would not be chosen for ground support if a suitable alternative was available.

The British Government is only called in to clear exports of such an aircraft when the question of an export licence arises. It would certainly look with disapproval on the sale to Iraq of such an aircraft as the Lightning.



legis Pa  
"Athen S Fur  
"RAC"  
Mr Adland  
to see  
bmt.

Useful article read  
in the FCO news section  
"no course" being  
Zs. very good  
AM 9  
9  
AM  
10/1

AMMA  
8/9



CONFIDENTIAL

(78)

10th September, 1969

Ref: AP/32/021

I was glad to learn from your letter of 11th July that mine of 27th June to Allen Greenwood had reached you. Allen had asked me to forecast the sales problems of the Lightning and Jaguar in Iraq, and in my reply I tried to set out clearly the main considerations surrounding the sale of military aircraft to that country at the moment. These still obtain.

Through statements by Government spokesmen and discussions with our Embassy, the Iraq Government are fully aware of HMG's general policy towards arms supplies in the Middle East. They have, moreover, been clearly informed that it is necessary for them to state a firm interest in specific equipment. To this we have had no positive response. Instead, they appear to regard a favourable settlement of their negotiations with IPC as a pre-requisite to expressing a firm interest in purchasing major military equipment.

IPC is, as you may know, an international consortium, and they have commercial interests at stake running into several £100m. In expecting HMG to intervene to secure a settlement favourable to Iraq, the latter are wildly over-estimating the Government's position in relation to IPC. The prospects of these negotiations reaching an early conclusion have been set back by the recent Iraq/Russian oil agreement. So long as the Iraqis persist in thinking an order for the Lightning to an IPC settlement, progress is bound to be slow.

This is in effect to record the position which I understand was given orally to you during my absence on leave.

J. R. CHRISTIE

G.M. Hobday, Esq.,  
British Aircraft Corporation Ltd.,  
Preston Division,  
Warton Aerodrome,  
Preston,  
Lancashire.

c.c. EIR1A ✓  
EIR1B  
File



P. Hinchcliffe Esq., ~~FILED IN~~  
REGISTRY No. 10

~~15 SEP 1969~~

With the Compliments of

C.B. Benjamin

NEQ 10/1

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 1(a)

03

18/9

DTSD ~~17/9~~

OK DEPT

then enter

Ch. PUMA 1519  
P.A. Jan 22/9



DTS.D. hi Stephenson

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
19 SEP 1969  
NEQ 10/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Tun.

Recopy  
of cap called  
to 204.

I attach a copy of  
a routine export licence  
application for export of  
cartridges for use on  
Lightnings. (ID/4770/69).

~~The~~ ~~sale~~ I should be  
interested to know if  
there is anything ~~truth~~ in this.  
As you know, the question  
of Lightnings for Iraq  
has been on & off for  
over a year.

Regy. Reg on Lightnings/plb  
B.U. 19/10/69. noted.  
Re (11/10)

Near Eastern Dept. (Mr. Hunsballe)

Both this licence as the "Canberra"  
one are cancelled as they are mistaken  
by Martin Baker. Other licences will  
be submitted with the same requirements,  
but for jet power — which is longer  
have.

CS/Stephenson  
DTS 19/9



1D/4770/69

NEQ 6/1  
204



MARTIN-BAKER AIRCRAFT CO. LTD.,  
HIGHER DENHAM,  
NR. UXBRIDGE, MIDDLESEX.

NONE

FOR USE ON OUR MANUFACTURED EJECTION  
SEAT IN SERVICE WITH THE IRAQI AIR  
FORCE FOR THE ~~LIGHTNING~~ AIRCRAFT.

CS/76/57

*E. Titmou*  
E. TITMOUS  
MANAGER SALES OFFICE  
9TH SEPTEMBER 1969

ET/JW/B OF T/EX.LIC.

MARTIN-BAKER  
AIRCRAFT CO. LTD.,

MARTIN-BAKER AIRCRAFT CO.LTD.  
HIGHER DENHAM,  
NR. UXBRIDGE,  
MIDDLESEX.

IRAQ

12	CARTRIDGES AT £1.56 EACH	£18.72
12	CARTRIDGES AT £1.00 EACH	£12.00
60 SETS	CARTRIDGES AT £4.97 EACH	£298.20
CONSIGNEE	IRAQI AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE UNIT, MUASKER AL-RASHID C/O IRAQI REPUBLICAN RAILWAYS, BASRAH, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ.	
AGENT	THERE IS NO AGENT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ORDER.	
ROUTE	BY SEA OR AIR.	

for ~~training~~ aircraft



£328.92



Mr. Hinchcliffe o.r.

Mr. D.C. Walke, CRED, Board of Trade asked whether any progress had been made over the sale of Lightnings to Iraq. I told him that the whole thing seemed to have run into the sand, but that I would let you know of the Board of Trade's interest in your return, so that you could keep him in the picture when appropriate.

JH 12.9.69

I told Mr. Walke on 14/10 that the Iraqis seemed to have lost interest in the Lightnings & rules & that the lesson was now remote.

AMH

14/10

fa.



Head, Near Eastern  
Dept.

~~Xerox for~~  
~~DTG~~

**NO COPIES MADE**

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO STOW U/N OF 21/15 CYPHER/CAT A UNIT 15 JOHNSON

**IMMEDIATE**

Mr. Acland

JAGUAR FOR IRAQ

This is what finally  
went out. I think  
it is alright.

Now See letter to  
Mr McKenney at  
Colos O

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

**FROM EIR 1(A) MINTECH.**

MM

29/10

AM Hume  
22/10

**YOUR STOW 35. AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQ.**

1. AT THE MEETING WITH GENERAL SHENSHAL IN APRIL WE WERE DELIBERATELY UNSPECIFIC ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF JAGUAR. IN VIEW OF THE AIRCRAFT'S DEVELOPMENT STATUS WE COULD NOT DO OTHERWISE. BAC, HOWEVER, IN THEIR LETTER TO THE GENERAL HAD SAID THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS DUE TO BE ENTERING SQUADRON SERVICE WITH THE FRENCH AIR FORCE IN MID-1971. WE COULD ONLY CONFIRM THIS IN DISCUSSION, BUT ADDED THAT EXPORT CUSTOMERS COULD NOT LOOK TO OBTAINING ANY AIRCRAFT UNTIL SOME TIME AFTER THIS.
2. MORE PRECISELY, WE SUGGESTED THE GUIDELINE THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT IN OUR STABLE WOULD VARY ACCORDING TO THEIR STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THE LIGHTNING BEING ALREADY IN PRODUCTION COULD BE DELIVERED IN SOME TWO YEARS. THE HARRIER, WHICH WAS ON THE POINT OF ENTERING RAF SQUADRON SERVICE, WOULD TAKE SOME MONTHS LONGER. AND THE JAGUAR, STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT AND TWO YEARS AWAY FROM SQUADRON SERVICE, WOULD TAKE THE LONGEST. IT WAS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE TIMING OF ACTUAL DELIVERIES WOULD VARY ACCORDING TO THE DATE WHEN CONTRACTS WERE PLACED.
3. ALL THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED TO GIVE THE GENERAL THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JAGUAR WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO IRAQ IN 1971. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT HE HAS DEDUCED THIS FROM THE FIGURE QUOTED BY BAC FOR THE FRENCH VERSION TO ENTER SQUADRON SERVICE, AND



3. ALL THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED TO GIVE THE GENERAL THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JAGUAR WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO IRAQ IN 1971. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT HE HAS DEDUCED THIS FROM THE FIGURE QUOTED BY BAC FOR THE FRENCH VERSION TO ENTER SQUADRON SERVICE, AND POSSIBLY THE FIRM MAY HAVE PUT AN OPTIMISTIC SLANT ON THEIR REMARKS WHEN THE GENERAL WAS AT WATSON. BUT THIS IS DIFFICULT TO PROVE CONCLUSIVELY.

4. SINCE SHENSHAL'S VISIT, THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF SLIPPING. AT THE MOMENT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO EXPECT DELIVERY OF THE EARLIEST VERSION OF THE AIRCRAFT (THE FRENCH) TO START IN LESS THAN 30 MONTHS FROM DATE OF CONTRACT - MID 1972 IF AN ORDER WERE PLACED TOWARDS THE END OF THIS YEAR, AND FOR THE BRITISH VERSION SOME 12 MONTHS BEYOND THIS. THERE CAN THUS BE NO QUESTION OF PROVIDING AT LEAST A SQUADRON FOR IRAQ IN 1971.

5. ON PRICES, BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT IS STILL GOING THROUGH ITS DEVELOPMENT IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE SURE WHAT THE EVENTUAL EXPORT PRICE WILL BE. BUT SEPECAT, THE ANGLO-FRENCH INDUSTRIAL GROUP BUILDING THE AIRCRAFT, ARE QUOTING A FIGURE OF SOME POUNDS 800,000 FOR THE FIRST VERSION. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT THIS IS A FIRM PRICE, FOR IT MAY ESCALATE. THE RAF VERSION IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EXPENSIVE, THOUGH WITH A MORE ADVANCED EQUIPMENT FIT.

6. THESE ARE THE FACTS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ACTUALLY PRODUCING THE AIRCRAFT. BUT OVER AND ABOVE THESE THE SUPPLY OF JAGUAR TO IRAQ DOES PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. AS A PRIMARILY STRIKE AIRCRAFT IT HAS A MARKEDLY BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN THE HUNTER IN RANGE, SPEED AND WEAPON LOAD. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF SOVIET PENETRATION OF IRAQ THE PROSPECT OF SUPPLYING THE AIRCRAFT SHORTLY AFTER THE RAF OBTAIN THEIR FIRST JAGUARS IS MOST UNWELCOME TO MOD. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MIDDLE EAST THESE FACTORS ARE NOT LIKELY TO COMMEND AN IRAQI ORDER FOR JAGUAR TO MINISTERS. FRENCH AGREEMENT IS MOREOVER REQUIRED FOR THE SUPPLY OF JAGUAR TO THIRD COUNTRIES. EVEN THE HARRIER IS A QUESTIONABLE ITEM IF IT IS GOING TO PRESENT OUR VTOL TECHNOLOGY TO THE RUSSIANS ON A PLATE.

7. IT WAS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE TOOK THE LINE WE DID IN DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL SHENSHAL. IN REPLYING TO GENERAL SHENSHAL, PERHAPS YOU COULD USE THE MATERIAL IN THE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS TELEGRAM.

8. SINCE SHENSHAL'S VISIT, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED, AND OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT ON POLITICAL/SECURITY GROUNDS HMG APPROVAL UNLIKELY FOR ANY NEW TYPE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQ FOR SOME TIME. IF YOU FEEL YOU HAVE TO GIVE A LEAD, YOU COULD TAKE THE LINE THAT AS STATED IN PARA. 2 THE LIGHTNING COMES CLOSEST IN AVAILABILITY TO THE IRAQ TIMESCALE. BUT EVEN HERE YOU SHOULD NOT IMPLY THAT EVENTUAL APPROVAL WILL BE FORTHCOMING.



16 October, 1969

(NEQ.10/1)

Aircraft to Iraq

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter AP/160/058 AP/32/021 of 14 October with which you enclosed a draft telegram in reply to Baghdad STOW No. 35.

2. You are well aware of the many problems connected with the supply of arms to the Middle East and in particular to a country like Iraq.

3. We see very little prospect of circumstances changing sufficiently for us to contemplate recommending approval for the sale of Jaguar to Iraq - at any rate early in its operational life. The same applies to Harrier. Lightning is perhaps a more border-line case, but we could not be sure which way a decision would go if and when a firm order were placed.

4. We realise that this situation puts you (who have to handle visits of delegations like that headed by General Shenshal) and Air Attachés (who have to deal with subsequent enquiries) in a difficult position. But as I am sure you agree, it is greatly preferable not to raise false hopes or to encourage interest in types of equipment which we cannot subsequently release. To do so only causes greater disappointment and misunderstanding at a later date.

5. We think that this must be made very clear to the Air Attaché in Baghdad and with these considerations in mind I have made some brief alterations to the text of your draft telegram and have suggested a complete re-wording of the latter half of paragraph 7.

/6.

C. B. Benjamin Esq.,  
Ministry of Technology,  
Stuart House,  
23/25 Soho Square,  
London W.1.



6. You may feel that more material should be given to the Air Attaché to help him parry further questions from General Shenshal about the availability of Jaguar after 1971. Perhaps he should reply on the lines that it is normally our practice to have an aircraft in service for two years or so before arranging its export to other countries. As the British version is not to be in squadron service until 1973, it would not be available before 1975 and must be ruled out from Iraqi consideration.

7. We would, also think it advisable to brief the Air Attaché that he should not attempt to stimulate interest in Harriers or in other sophisticated type of aircraft. We would be grateful if you would consider this point too.

(P. R. M. Hincheliffe)

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

- 2 -

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Reference: Your Sto 35

Subject: Aircraft for Iraq

1. At the meeting with Gen. Shenshal in April we were deliberately unspecific about the availability of Jaguar. In view of the aircraft's development status we could not do otherwise. BAC, however, in their letter to the General had said that the aircraft was due to be entering squadron service with the French Air Force in mid-1971. We could only confirm this in discussion, but added that expert customers could not look to obtaining any aircraft until some time after this.
2. More precisely, we suggested the guideline that the availability of aircraft in our stable would vary according to their stage of development. The Lightning being already in production could be delivered in some two years. The Harrier, which was on the point of entering RAF squadron service, would take some months longer. And the Jaguar, still at an early stage of development and two years away from squadron service, would take the longest. It was also made clear that the timing of actual deliveries would vary according to the date when contracts were placed.
3. All this was certainly not intended to give the General the impression that the Jaguar would be available to Iraq in 1971. We can only assume that he has deduced this from the figure quoted by BAC for the French version to enter squadron service, and possibly the firm may have put an optimistic slant on their remarks when the General was at Warton. But this is difficult to prove conclusively.
4. Since Shenshal's visit the development programme has shown signs of slipping, with some particularly difficult problems occurring on the engine. At the moment it would be imprudent to expect delivery of the earliest version of the aircraft (the French) to start in less than 30 months from



date of contract - mid 1972 of an order were placed towards the end of this year, and for the British version some 12 months beyond this. There can thus be no question of providing at least a squadron for Iraq in 1971.

5. On prices, because the aircraft is still going through its development it is difficult to be sure what the eventual export price will be. But SEPECAT, the Anglo-French industrial group building the aircraft, are quoting a figure of some £800,000 for the first version. This may escalate. The RAF version is likely to be some £80-100,000 more expensive, though with a more advanced equipment fit.

6. These are the facts on the feasibility of actually producing the aircraft. But over and above these, the supply of Jaguar to Iraq presents major political and security problems. As a primarily strike aircraft it has a markedly better performance than the Hunter in range, speed and weapon load. Moreover in view of Soviet penetration of Iraq, the prospect of supplying the aircraft before or shortly after the RAF obtain their first Jaguars is most unwelcome to MOD. In the present circumstances of the Middle East these and other factors are not likely to commend an Iraqi order for Jaguar to Ministers. French approval is also required for the supply of Jaguar to third countries.

7. It was for these reasons, that we took the line we did in discussion with General Shenshal. In replying to General Shenshal you could give him as facts, the information in paragraphs 1-5. This rules out delivery to Iraq in 1971. It is important however that you should not leave any impression whatsoever that HMG approval could be forthcoming for the supply of Jaguar at a later date.



From: M.H. Tallboys, Head of DS13.



6033

D/DS13/178/1 (P2 II)

17th October, 1969

Aircraft to Iraq

In your letter of 14th October you referred to the Iraqi interest in Jaguar and asked for my comments on the draft telegram which you proposed to send to our Embassy in Baghdad.

2. I am quite content for my part with the proposed telegram which makes the best of the situation as far as I can see.
3. As you rightly say Jaguar is particularly sensitive and I cannot conceive that we would be willing to sell to Iraq in 1971 or indeed for a good many years after, even if there were no production problems.
4. I do not see the need for any meeting to discuss the telegram but the subject could if necessary be raised again at the next Arms Working Party meeting which is due to be held on 28th October.
5. I am copying this letter to Hinchliffe on the Iraq desk of the FCO and also to other AWP members.

M. H. TALLBOYS

Pa  
PMA  
2/10

C.B. Benjamin, Esq.,  
EIR1a,  
Mintech,  
Stuart House,  
Room 305.

CONFIDENTIAL



m<sup>r</sup> A. K. M.  
✓

83

(NEQ.10/11)

Mr. Tripp

c.c. Mr. Acland

Jaguar for Iraq

I attach a copy of Baghdad telegram STOW 35 *below*, addressed to the Ministry of Technology, who are preparing a reply which will be cleared by us. Mr. Christie's recollection of what was said at the meeting on 30 April is somewhat different from General Shenshal's!

2. Anglo-French cooperation for building the Jaguar aircraft is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 17 May, 1965, together with five Supplements. Paragraph 27 of the Memorandum governs the sale to third countries of Jaguars and states that:

"It is the firm intention of the associated governments to act in agreement with each other in all matters related to sales to other countries of equipment developed or its derivatives and in the concession of licences".

In February, 1966 the Foreign Secretary decided that proposals to initiate sales promotion of the Jaguar inside South Africa would not be permitted on the grounds that to sell the aircraft would contravene the United Nations Security Council Resolution. The French Government were informed. In December 1968 the French Government asked HMG to reconsider this attitude but were told that the decision of February 1966 still held.

3. It follows therefore that as far as the sale of Jaguar to Iraq is concerned, quite apart from our own political and security objections, French permission would be required before the deal could be finalised. The French version of the aircraft (60% French, 40% British) may be ready for squadron service in late 1971, and the British version (60% British) will not be ready until 1974.

*P.R.M. Hinchcliffe*

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
14 October, 1969

M<sup>r</sup>

FLAVIN  
CSS 10/33.



Mr. Tripp has seen these papers.

You will see that we are to be consulted about the reply to Baghdad which will presumably reveal what Mr. Christie thinks he said to General Shenshal.

2. Meanwhile you asked for the facts about Anglo/French agreement over sales of Tapanar. This is explained in Mr. Hinchcliffe's minute.

~~AA~~ Acland  
15/X

Mr. Arthur

Nothing must be done to encourage Iraqi interest in Tapanar. Please look at Mr. C's draft carefully with that in mind.

12. Acland.

See separate  
minutes draft

~~AM~~ 21/X

$\sum_{16}$   
10.

for ~~AM~~  
29/6/53





DS. Form
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 OCT 1969
NEQ 10/1

With the Compliments of

PS | M. H. TALLBOYS

20.10.69  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall  
London, S.W.1.  
Whitehall 7022



S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 35

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
11 OCTOBER 1969

W 83

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 OCT 1969
---

SECRET.

EIR FOR CHRISTIE. GENERAL GHENSHAL ADAMANT THAT DURING WASH-UP CONFERENCE 30 APRIL YOU PERSONALLY GAVE 1971 AS DELIVERY DATE FOR JAGUAR SPECIFICALLY TO IRAQ. IF MINIMUM OF ONE SQUADRON CAN BE DELIVERED IN 1971 IRAQ WISH TO PURCHASE. REQUIRE TO KNOW HOW MANY AIRCRAFT COULD BE DELIVERED IN 1971 EARLIEST DELIVERY DATE AND RATE OF DELIVERY. ALSO REQUIRE PRICE DETAILS. REPLY NEEDED URGENTLY. POINTEDLY ADVISED THAT FRENCH ARE NOT BEING CONSULTED. SATISFACTORY <sup>R</sup>REPLY WOULD LEAD TO REQUIREMENT FOR B.A.C. TO VISIT IRAQ TO DISCUSS DETAIL. IRAQ GOVERNMENT-S DESIRE TO PURCHASE JAGUAR WAS ALSO EXPRESSED BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO HBM AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING.

MR. BALFOUR-PAUL

[SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINTECH DUTY OFFICER]

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. DEPT.  
DEF. T & S.D.

ADVANCE COPY SENT

S E C R E T

GGGGG



MD/144/17/7 Please enter ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Miss K. B. Wood



Our reference:  
Your reference:

DS 8a/19/10  
AP/160/058  
AP/32/021

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: ~~01-930 7022~~ 01-930 7022 Ext 7038

NEQ 10/1

1st October 1969

Dear Mr Benjamin,

AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ

DS 13 have passed me a copy of your letter of 14th October 1969, as I now represent the Air Staff on the Arms Working Party.

We would suggest the following amendments to your draft signal to Baghdad:

Para 4, delete second sentence and substitute:

"At the moment it would be imprudent to expect delivery of the RAF version of the aircraft to start before mid-1973, and then only provided that industrial capacity could be expanded sufficiently to avoid interference with deliveries to the RAF".

Para 6, delete "before or".

I am sending copies of this letter to Mr Tallboys, (MOD DS 13), Mr Stephenson and Mr Hinchliffe (FCO).

Yours sincerely,

K Wood

R. W. M.  
24/10

C.B. Benjamin Esq  
Ministry of Technology  
Stuart House  
23-25 Soho Square  
W.1.

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CONFIDENTIAL



MD/144/17/7



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REGISTRY No. 10  
22 OCT 1969

NEQ 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Miss K.E. Wood

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone ~~01-930 7022~~ ~~01-930 7038~~

01-930 7022 Ext 7038

85

Our reference:  
Your reference:

DS 8a/19/10  
AP/160/058  
AP/32/021

21st October 1969

Dear Mr Benjamin,

AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ

DS 13 have passed me a copy of your letter of 14th October 1969, as I now represent the Air Staff on the Arms Working Party.

We would suggest the following amendments to your draft signal to Baghdad:

Para 4, delete second sentence and substitute:

"At the moment it would be imprudent to expect delivery of the RAF version of the aircraft to start before mid-1973, and then only provided that industrial capacity could be expanded sufficiently to avoid interference with deliveries to the RAF".

Para 6, delete "before or".

I am sending copies of this letter to Mr Tallboys, (MOD DS 13), Mr Stephenson and Mr Hinchliffe (FCO).

Yours sincerely,

K Wood

Reg ch.  
PMM

22/10

Re/WWH  
3d/10

C.B. Benjamin Esq  
Ministry of Technology  
Stuart House  
23-25 Soho Square  
W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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
*humbach.*

EIR1 (a)

Stuart House,  
23/25 Scho Square,  
London, W.1.  
Tel. 01. 437. 9283

(86)

AP/160/058 AP/32/021



14th October, 1969.

Aircraft to Iraq

You will recall that a few AWP Meetings ago, we touched on the problem that we are facing in Iraq as a result of BAC's sales activities, originally centred upon pushing the Lightning, but subsequently expanded to a wider range of aircraft and equipment. In view of the apparent quiescence or lack of response from Iraq to the visit made by Gen. Shenshal in April this year, I said that we were not proposing to stir the waters unnecessarily. But you will see from the attached telegram from Baghdad that the Iraqi interest now seems to have centred upon the Jaguar.

... As we have noted all along, this aircraft, above all others, raises the sharpest political, security, etc., problems. At the same time, however, we are called upon to let Baghdad have an early reply. I am accordingly attaching a draft telegram as guidance to our post, which I am also copying to other AWP members and Hinchliffe on the Iraq desk of the FCO.

In view of the urgency, perhaps recipients of this minute could let us have their reactions in writing as quickly as possible, and if necessary we could have a small ad hoc discussion.

C. B. Benjamin

M. H. Tallboys, Esq.,  
Head of DS13,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Main Building,  
Whitehall, S.W. 1.



PRIORITY STOW 35 SENT 13.11.69

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM KIR 1A NINTECH

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR STOW 38.

THE QUESTION OF JAGUAR IS POSING PROBLEMS AND WE ARE STILL  
THINKING.

ORIG:- KIR 1A2

INFO:- US/KIR

AS/KIR

NEAR EASTERN DEPT. P.C.O.

FILE NO:- AP/32/021/AP/160/058

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
14 NOV 1969

NEO 10/1

86

Regsky.  
PMM

B/11



CONFIDENTIAL

Near Eastern Department,

(87)

(NEQ 10/1)

23 October, 1969.

Aircraft for Iraq

You will of course have seen the exchange of telegrams between the Air Attache and the Ministry of Technology (resting with MinTech's STOW unnumbered if 21 October), about the availability of the Jaguar and the possibility of it being supplied to Iraq.

2. In discussing this with the Ministry of Technology here, we pointed out the many problems connected with the supply of arms to the Middle East and in particular to Iraq and we explained that we saw very little prospect of circumstances changing sufficiently for us to contemplate recommending approval for the sale of Jaguar (or Harrier) to Iraq, at any rate early in their operational life. We said that we thought Lightning was a mere border line case, but we would not be sure which way a decision would go if and when a firm order were placed. We asked the Ministry to bear these points in mind and to make it quite clear when replying to the Air Attache that he, when clarifying the availability timetable of Jaguar, to General Shenshal, should not leave any impression that HMQ's approval could be forthcoming for the supply of this aircraft, even at a later date.

3. The STOW telegram under reference does not make this point quite as clearly as we would have wished. I am sure that you yourself are in no doubt on this score, but perhaps you would keep an eye on the matter and if you think it necessary, have a word with Wing Commander Harrison about the line he might take. I realise the difficulties of his position in having to be unforthcoming in the face of Iraqi probings, but it is greatly preferable not to raise false hopes or to encourage interest in types of equipment which we cannot subsequently release. Although Lightning might in some circumstances be slightly easier to authorise, he should do nothing to push it either, at the present time.

(A. A. Acland)

P. J. McKearney, Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry  
No. NEQ 10/1

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.To:—  
R. J. McKearney,  
British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD

From

Mr. Acland  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NED

## PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Aircraft for Iraq~~You will of course have seen~~  
~~Please refer~~ to the exchange of telegrams

between the Air Attache and the Ministry of Technology (resting with Min Tech's STOW unnumbered of 21 October), about the availability of the Jaguar and the possibility of it being supplied to Iraq.

2. In discussing this with the Ministry of Technology here, we pointed out the many problems connected with the supply of arms to the Middle East and in particular to Iraq and we explained that we saw very little prospect of circumstances changing sufficiently for us to contemplate recommending approval for the sale of Jaguar (or Harrier) to Iraq, at any rate early in their operational life. We said that we thought Lightning was a more border line case, but we could not be sure which way a decision would go if and when a firm order were placed. We asked the Ministry to bear the points in mind and to make it quite clear when replying to the Air Attache that he, ~~should be instructed~~ when clarifying the availability timetable of Jaguar, to General Shenshal ~~that he~~, should not ~~ever~~ leave any impression ~~whatsoever~~ that HMG's approval could be forthcoming for the supply of this aircraft, even at a later date.

3. ~~I do not think that~~ The STOW telegram under ~~reference~~ <sup>do not</sup> ~~makes~~ <sup>quite as clearly as we would have wished</sup> this point clear ~~so I would be~~

/grateful

/an




I am sure that you yourself are in no doubt on this score, but  
~~grateful if you would, on the basis of this letter,~~  
have a word with Wing Commander Harrison <sup>about</sup> ~~on the~~  
~~the line he might take~~  
subject. I <sup>realize</sup> ~~appreciate~~ the difficulties of his  
position <sup>in</sup> having to be ~~as~~ unforthcoming ~~as possible~~  
in the face of Iraqi probings, but ~~as I am sure both~~  
~~you and he will agree,~~ it is greatly preferable not  
to raise <sup>FALSE</sup> ~~fake~~ hopes or to encourage interest in  
types of equipment which we cannot subsequently release.

~~Although Lightning might in some circumstances~~  
~~In this connection it might be wiser in the long~~  
~~be slightly easier to anticipate, he should do~~  
~~run if he refrained from taking the lead in~~

<sup>'Positive'</sup>  
~~mentioning the Lightning (see paragraph 8 of the~~  
~~STOW telegram) ~~Despite the name given in~~~~  
~~Paragraph 8 of the STOW telegram.~~

sure, but  
perhaps you  
would keep  
an eye on  
the matter  
and if  
you think  
it necessary,

nothing to push  
it either at the  
present time.

 23  
1/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Reference.....

Mr. Tripp

I agree. ST approved

Jaguar for Iraq

903/16.10

A draft reply to Mr. Benjamin's letter of 14 October is attached.

Flag B

2. I think that this is consistent with Mr. Arthur's minute of 16 October that nothing must be done to encourage Iraqi interest in Jaguar and that the reply to STOW telegram No. 35 should be looked at carefully with this in mind.

*A. A. Acland*

(A. A. Acland)  
16 October, 1969.

*R. P. M.**29/10*



1 ~~Zero~~  
NEQ 10/1

88

ADVANCE COPY

42. N.E. Dept

42. D.T.S. Dept

[sent to MINTECH]

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO STOW 38

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

29 OCTOBER 1969

Regy. & T. loc. in  
as tel. from Min Tech to Baghdad  
acknowledged this.  
Please reg. & loc. d.  
RWA  
21/11.

~~Mr Ireland~~

Mr Hindcliffe

As I feared,

the tel. from Min Tech was  
not nearly explicit enough.  
The Air Attache has just not  
understood. It is not a question  
of moving cautiously. We cannot  
give any impression that we can  
move at all.

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR U/N TEL OF 21 OCTOBER: SALE OF JAGUAR TO  
IRAQ.

We must be consulted  
about the reply, which  
must make it clear that

WHILE WE TAKE THE POINT THAT WE NEED TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY,  
WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE SOME REPLY TO GENLSHENSAL'S DIRECT  
ENQUIRIES. BEFORE DOING SO HOWEVER WE SHOULD  
BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

Tajwan are  
ruled out for  
the foreseeable  
future.

(A) IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, EARLIEST DELIVERY DATE IS  
IMPORTANT TO IRAQIS AND THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH  
A LESS ADVANCED EQUIPMENT FIT, FRENCH VERSION  
WOULD SUIT THEM BETTER AND MIGHT OFFER US FEWER SECURITY  
PROBLEMS. FROM COMMERCIAL POINT OF VIEW THERE  
FORE IT WOULD SEEM SENSIBLE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE  
IRAQIS TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TOWARDS FRENCH VERSION IF, AS  
WE ASSUME, THE TWO VERSIONS ARE NOT IN COMPETITION



WOULD SUIT THEM BETTER AND MIGHT OFFER US FEWER SECURITY PROBLEMS. FROM COMMERCIAL POINT OF VIEW THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM SENSIBLE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE IRAQIS TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TOWARDS FRENCH VERSION IF, AS WE ASSUME, THE TWO VERSIONS ARE NOT IN COMPETITION WITH EACH OTHER BECAUSE THEY ARE MADE BY A JOINT COMPANY. FRENCH AIR ATTACHE HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH US ON ANY PROSPECTIVE SALE OF JAGUAR TO IRAQ. DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO COOPERATE IN MARKETING BOTH VERSIONS? IF SO, THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO OUR SHARING INFORMATION WITH OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUES-

(B) HOWEVER, I PRESUME THAT H.M.G.'S AGREEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR SALE OF FRENCH VERSION AS WELL AS BRITISH TO THIRD COUNTRIES. SHOULD YOU CONSIDER THAT APPROVAL TO SELL FRENCH VERSION TO IRAQ MIGHT BE EASIER TO OBTAIN, THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN CASE FOR DIRECTING IRAQI'S ATTENTION TOWARDS IT.

PAUL

SENT AT 1200Z/29 OCT  
RECD AT 1322Z/29 OCT



Mr. Mahan

THURSDAY FOR 1 NOV

Please see Folios 83-89.

D.A. Baghdad has with ~~no~~ comment  
the point or genuine misadventure Mini  
Teel. with <sup>weekly</sup> instructions.

I have told Mr. Benjamin that Tapan  
has not in a long time was covered for  
one year to one as that we should stop  
only D.A. / Iraq has developed the  
the Iraqis not the intention that we wanted  
to tell them the aircraft.

Mr. Benjamin has promised not to send  
a representative early to Folio (89) without  
consulting us. I intended that his  
A/S is here to tell Tapan (the French  
version) to Iraq as well take some  
stopping.

You may need to visit developments. The  
Post knows our views from Folio (87) and  
Mr. Simmons was told to make the same  
points - verbally & carefully.

خير! ان شاء الله

By 3 Dec.

✓ noted  
JH 24/11

W. H. Hall

21/11

I spoke



I spoke to Mr Benjamin  
who was a little vague, but  
said he has not yet sent  
a substantive reply because  
of the need to discuss with

BAC. I made the point  
that this was a matter of  
instructions for the A.A.

Thalston  
4.12.69

Bu. 18/12/69  
seen for you  
18/12

Novree

92

rel was

behind about Tabor & sub. reply

to (88)

unrecd.

P.A.

PMH

8/12



Please enter 12/21  
From: Miss K.E. Wood

CONFIDENTIAL

(89)




**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext. 7038

Our reference: DS8a/19/10  
Your reference:



20th November, 1969  
Jm 25/11  
DTSS.

Dear Mr Tallboys,

Arms Sales to Iraq

RAF Security have expressed misgivings about possible misinterpretation of the Air Force Department views on arms sales to Iraq expressed at item (vii) of the minutes of the Arms Working Party meeting held on 30th September 1969 (AWP/M(69)8).

They consider that sub-paragraphs b. c. and d., although governed by the overriding qualification at sub-paragraph a., might at some future date be quoted out of context and give the impression that the Air Staff would have no objection to the supply of Lightnings Mark 55 equipped with Red Top to the Iraqis, after 1971. This is not so, and if sales negotiations were re-opened the question of release of information and equipment would have to be reconsidered by the Air Staff.

I am copying this letter to all members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

K Wood

Mr Kunchappa  
for information

M.H. Tallboys, Esq  
Chairman  
Arms Working Party

to 29/11  
DWD.

CONFIDENTIAL



**Copies to:**

Mr A.B. Fayle, DS13b	}	Ministry of Defence
Mr G.T. Toon, DS13c		
Miss B.M. Potter, Sales (N)		
Mr R.W. Browne, Sales(A)		
Wg Cdr A.B. Stinchcome, DPS(C Team)		
Mrs D.E.J. Brooke (DI73)	}	Ministry of Technology
Mr O.G.E. Dickson, Treasury		
Mr A.D.G. Stephenson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office		
Mr J. Coates, EIR2		
Mr L.A. Savigar, EIR1		
Miss M. Betteridge, Board of Trade		

RAF Sy 1b, Ministry of Defence



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REGISTRY No. 10  
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Security Classification : CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

\*CABLE ~~X~~ SAVINGRAM

FOR O.S.(Tels)2 USE ONLY

Date &  
T.O.D.

4-12-69

Serial No.

STOW U/N

ORIGINAL AND FOUR legible carbon copies, all on Avmin Form 97, typed (or in BLOCK CAPITALS if in manuscript) on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

\*Objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) C. B. Benjamin  
Rank EIR.1(a), Mintech.  
Branch Principal  
Building Stuart Hse.  
Room 305 Ext. 105  
Date 4.12.69.

COUNTERSIGNED

Signed *C. Benjamin* - Eo/220  
Rank for Principal  
Branch EIR.1(a), Mintech.  
Date 4.12.69.

DISTRIBUTION :—

Originator

EIR.1(a)

INFORMATION COPIES TO :—

US/EIR  
AS/EIR.1  
EIR.2(c)  
Near Eastern Dept., FCO  
DTSD, FCO  
Western European Dept., FCO.  
DS.8, MOD.  
DS.13, MOD.

File No. AP/160/058  
AP/32/021

†Priority marking: PRIORITY

TO : PARIS

FOR : \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : EIR.1(a), Mintech.

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

1. Military Aircraft to Iraq. My Stow U/N to Baghdad.

2. We understand that the French are re-asserting their sales drive for the Mirage III/V to Iraq.

Without alerting the French we should be grateful for assessment of activity and likely current French political view, given their embargo policy to withhold the Mirages ordered by Israel.

Reg & p.a.  
Am 5/10

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

\*Delete as appropriate

MinTech (late Avmin) Form 97 (revised April 1965)

Security Classification:

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RECEIVED IN <b>DRAFT</b> - 8 DEC 1969	TELEGRAM <b>CABLE</b> <b>SAVINGRAM</b>
---	--

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FOR O.S.(Tels)2 USE ONLY	
Date & T.O.D.	4-12-69 (92)
Serial No.	STOW U/N

\*No correction to teleprinter if available

# ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) C. B. Benjamin  
Rank Principal  
Branch EIR.1(a)  
Building Stuart House  
Room 305 Ext. 105  
Date 4th December, 1969.

# COUNTERSIGNED

Signed [Signature]  
Rank Principal  
Branch EIR.1(a)  
Date 4.12.69.

# DISTRIBUTION :-

Originator

EIR.1(a)

# INFORMATION COPIES TO :-

US/EIR  
AS/EIR.1  
Near Eastern Dept., ECO.  
DTSD, FCO.  
DS.8, MOD.  
DS.13, MOD.  
EIR.2(c), Mitech.

File No. AP/160/058  
AP/32/021

(8)

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

\*Delete as appropriate

†Priority marking: **PRIORITY**

TO : BAGHDAD, repeat PARIS

FOR : AIR ATTACHE

FROM : EIR.1(a), Mitech.

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

1. Ref. your Stow 38. Jaguars.

2. We have spoken to Morgan of BAC and explained the current objections to a sale of Jaguars to Iraq as outlined in my Stow U/N of 21.10.69.

3. He stressed that Iraqi interest was primarily focussed on Jaguar, but failing this they were pursuing the Mirage. In fact, this makes the Jaguar sale even less likely, because Dassault manufacture both the French element of Jaguar and the Mirage. To provide Jaguars in 1971 would in any event mean persuading the French Air Force to give up production places, and they in turn would expect to be compensated by an equivalent number of slots on the RAF allocation. It is difficult to see French industry going through this process of argument when they stand a chance of selling the Mirage, which in any event is commercially more valuable to them.

4. Morgan appeared to take the point. And we added that even if the prospects of gaining political and security approval existed, which at present was far from the case, the Government could not take a view unless and until the industrial and commercial capability existed to meet any such order, i.e. there was agreement with French industry and Air Forces that a specific proposal could be put forward. Morgan said that he would pursue this on the commercial net with his French

/opposite



TELEGRAM  
**DRAFT \*CABLE / SAVINGRAM**

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Date &  
T.O.D.

Serial No.

\*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Branch \_\_\_\_\_

Building \_\_\_\_\_

Room \_\_\_\_\_ Ext. \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTERSIGNED

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Branch \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION :—

Originator

INFORMATION COPIES TO :—

\_\_\_\_\_  
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 \_\_\_\_\_

File No. \_\_\_\_\_

†Priority marking: PRIORITY

TO : ZEN BAGHDAD, repeat PARIS

FOR : AIR ATTACHE

FROM : EIR.1(a), Mintech.

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

opposite numbers, if only to smoke out their intentions. He was also informed that we would need clear evidence that BAC as a whole, including their Rapiar side, supported any such approach to Iraq.


5. Present situation is therefore that we have offered BAC no hope of a Jaguar order to Iraq being approved in the present climate, and before a proposition could even be put we should need to be satisfied that it was a starter in terms of French agreement and production availability. You should accordingly offer no encouragement nor take any initiative.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

\*Delete as appropriate



*Passat EIR2 for catin.*  
*1.12.69*



(93)



**SECRET**

PARAPHASE NOT REQUIRED

NO UNCLASSIFIED MEXIDY OR REFERENCE

FOI 016/28

D.3.2. -TA- PP-MINTECH

FM F.C.O.

BT

**S E C R E T.**

00 7214

FOLLOWING FROM BAGHDAD TEL NO STOW 42 OF 28 NOVEMBER TO MINTECH.

**AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.**

1. A MEETING AT HQ IRAQI AIR FORCE ON 20 NOVEMBER APPARENTLY DECIDED TO LOOK TO FRANCE FOR A LOT OF EQUIPMENT. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THIS INCLUDES MIRAGE AIRCRAFT.
2. FIFTEEN OFFICERS INCLUDING THE JGS, DGS AND A HIGH PROPORTION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS WISHED TO LEAVE FOR PARIS ON 25 NOVEMBER BUT THE FRENCH INSISTED ON A POSTPONEMENT BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT ONE WEEK.
3. THE JGS APPARENTLY HOPED TO GO ON TO MOSCOW FROM PARIS TO LEAD A DIFFERENT DELEGATION BUT, AS A RESULT OF THE FRENCH POSTPONEMENT IS NOW LEAVING FOR MOSCOW ON 28 NOVEMBER. THE OBJECT OF THE VISIT IS NOT KNOWN.
4. DEFAT WAS SUMMONED TO MOD ON 27 NOVEMBER AND TOLD THAT THE DGS WAS DETERMINED THAT BRITISH AIR DEFENCE CONTROL EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE BOUGHT RATHER THAN FRENCH OR ANY OTHER.

*Handwritten signature*



5. IN PURSUIT OF THIS POLICY DEBAT WAS REQUESTED TO ARRANGE AN EARLY VISIT FOR AN (IRACI OFFICER TO A BRITISH AIR OPERATIONS CENTRE. INTEREST IS PARTICULARLY IN MODERN PLOTTING METHODS BASED ON AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE RADAR OF BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN PLOD OR C-N. THE VISITING OFFICER MIGHT BE A MAJOR KUSSAY AL-FADHLI WHO DID A RADAR COURSE IN UK IN 1957 OR AN OFFICER OF SIMILAR EXPERIENCE.

6. SUCH A VISIT WOULD OFFER PROSPECTS OF SALES OF EQUIPMENT IN THE CENTRE ITSELF AND MIGHT WELL FURTHER THE CHANCES OF MARCONI AND/OR PLESSEY IN THE EARLY WARNING FIELD. OTHER ADVANTAGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE SCHEME ARE APPARENT.

7. WILL YOU PLEASE REPLY URGENTLY WHETHER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RAF AND, IF SO, WHETHER IT COULD BE ARRANGED BEFORE CHRISTMAS. FOREIGN INTEREST IN THIS FIELD REQUIRES EARLY ACTION IF WE ARE TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY.

BT

**SECRET**

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

*Min of Tech (2) + tape*

*Via*

*Min of Tech Duty Officer*

*This copy sent ~~to~~  
direct to EIR.  
G 120*



CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Stephenson DSTD, FCO

DS8

FCO - Eastern Dept. and DSTD

HU/328/06

Reference

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 8 DEC 1969

NEQ 10/1

Iraq Interest in Air Defence Control

We have received a request from the Defence Attache in Baghdad to arrange a visit for an Iraqi officer to an Air Operations Centre in the U.K. In the current discussions on the updating of their whole military system the Iraq Air Force are understood to favour British air defence control equipment above any other. Interest is particularly indicated in modern plotting methods based on an early warning system which might include radars of both Western and Eastern Bloc origin - the IAF already have a number of Russian radars.

You will recall that the Iraq mission which visited the U.K. in April, 1969 was particularly interested in air defence control equipment. They visited R.A.F. Wattisham to see Lightning aircraft and at 1ACC, the R.A.F. Nomad type system, as well as discussing this latter equipment with the manufacturers, Plessey and Elliott. This visit by the DCGS of the Iraq Forces and his team, as guests of EIR, was arranged shortly after the re-establishing of diplomatic relations with the Iraq Government in order to follow up these protracted discussions on their air defence requirements which date back to 1963.

I should appreciate your advice on which operations centres would be of interest to the Iraqis and to which we should be prepared to admit an Iraqi officer. The officer concerned would probably be Major Kussay Al-Fadhli, who did a radar course in the U.K. in 1957 or an officer of similar experience. The visit would undoubtedly offer prospects of sales of equipment for the proposed Air Operations Centre and could well further the chances of the U.K. radar firms, Plessey and Marconi, to achieve some sales here after years of effort. Knowledge of the set-up and capabilities of the whole system which could result from such involvement should also be borne in mind. We request therefore that urgent and sympathetic consideration be given to this request. Will you please advise if the visit could be accepted before Christmas, effectively during the week beginning 8th December.

Mintech,  
EIR2C2,  
Rm. 214, Ext. 309,  
Stuart House.  
2nd December, 1969.

*Pamela F. Cotsford*

(Pamela F. Cotsford) Miss

Copies to: DD.Ops.GE(RAF)  
RAF Sy.1B

US/EIR  
AS/EIR2  
DS13

*P/M*  
*Mr*



LR/A3/4/10



Reference: DS 8/19/10  
Y. reference: HU/328/06

From: Mr. C. Davenport, DS 8

**SECRET**  
**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: ~~01-930 7022~~

01-930 7022 Extn 2140

Page 1 of 2 Pages

RECEIVED IN  
MINISTRY No. 10  
- DEC 1969

NEQ 10/11

95

4 December, 1969

1. Would you please refer to your minute of 2nd December about the Iraqi interest in air defence equipment and particularly the proposal that an Iraqi officer should visit an RAF air defence centre in the UK?
2. I should say at once that I am afraid a visit during the course of next week is really out of the question. Apart from the obviously short notice, 1 ACC (which would be the only suitable visit for what the Iraqis seem to have in mind) are currently in the process of re-constituting themselves following their recent return from Cyprus. Moreover, for a visit by an Iraqi officer, they would need to be given a very full brief which, I am sure you will agree, would take time to produce.
3. But, apart from such administrative problems, we have some reservations of principle about the proposal. Clearly it is more than possible that any information given to the Iraqis would find its way to the Russians. This means that, at this stage, we could arrange a visit at no higher than RESTRICTED level, i.e. although we could demonstrate our equipment in operation, we could not discuss the capabilities of our radars or our aircraft control methods.
4. As you say, the Iraq Air Force already have a number of Russian radars. Moreover, it seems reasonable to infer from the telegram attached to your minute that they are currently examining further air defence equipment in the Soviet Union and that they may eventually purchase such equipment. If an Iraqi officer were to visit the UK for similar purposes, the RAF would be put in the unsatisfactory position of having to advise on British equipment which the Iraqis might well be intending to integrate with other equipment about which we have insufficient knowledge. Conversely

/the

Miss P. F. Cotsford,  
Ministry of Technology  
EIR 2c  
Stuart House,  
23/25 Soho Square,  
London, W.1

**SECRET**

**SECRET**



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

the advice itself could well be of limited value to the Iraqis. Furthermore, we have no knowledge of the system which the UK contractors may have in mind for the Iraqis, or, for that matter, which the Iraqis themselves have in mind. This itself raises another point, namely the wisdom of discussing with the Iraqis equipment which, in the event, HMG may not be willing for them to acquire.

5. Although, as you say, an Iraqi mission has already visited RAF air defence units, I feel that the points I have outlined take on a new importance in the light of the Iraqis' evident parallel interest in Russian equipment.

6. There is a reasonable chance that we could arrange a visit at RESTRICTED level during the third week of December. But the RMIPC procedures necessary for securing clearance up to CONFIDENTIAL level would take at least a fortnight. Even assuming that such clearance was obtained (of which of course there can be no guarantee), there would thus be only a slim chance that a more meaningful visit could be arranged to take place before Christmas.

7. In the light of all this, and before we take any further action, you may, when you have had the FCO's comments, like to re-consider, perhaps in conjunction with DA Baghdad, whether the proposal for a visit (at either level) is in fact worth pursuing.

8. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

C. DAVENPORT

*[Handwritten signature]*

Copies to: US/EIR  
AS/EIR 2  
FCO(Near Eastern Dept)  
FCO(DPBD)

DS 13  
DD Ops(GE)(RAF)  
RAF Sy 1b

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Near Eastern Department**

**8 December, 1969**

(REQ) 10/2

96

**Air Defense Control - Iraq**

Thank you for your minute NU/328/06 of 2 December.

2. It is a little difficult usefully to comment on the proposal by the Defence Attaché in Baghdad, since we do not know what security classification or degree of sophistication attaches to the equipment which the Iraqis are believed to want, or which you would like the RAF to show to them.

3. There are two factors which we have to bear in mind;

- (a) we are bound by a Cabinet paper on arms sales which means, in effect, that it is unlikely that advanced sophisticated or highly classified weapons could be sold to Iraq;
- (b) we do not wish to incur the political illwill which would be caused if we encouraged interest in a sale, knowing full well we had no intention of selling.

**(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)**

Miss P. F. Cotford,  
EIR.2.G.2.  
Rm. 214,  
Ministry of Technology,  
Stuart House,  
London S.W.1.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Registry No. *NEP*

**DRAFT** *For Cite*

Type 1 + 3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential.  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

To:— *Miss P.F. Cotsford*  
*EIR 2 C.2*

From  
*P R M H*  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

*NEP*

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

*Air Defence ~~sales~~ Control - Iraq*

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minute HU/328/06 of 2 Dec.*

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usefully to comment on the  
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we had no intention of selling.



97

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO STOW 39 OF 12/12 CYPHER/CAT A UNIT 1 BANFORD  
ROUTINE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 15 DEC 1969 NEQ 10/1
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Reg. Pu  
Corylon  
Chant Wland  
MMA  
15/12

CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 39

TO BAGHDAD  
12 DECEMBER 1969

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR2C MINTECH.  
YOUR STOW 42: AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

1. REGRET IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE VISIT AS REQUESTED AND NOT AT SHORT NOTICE.
2. IRAQI REQUIREMENT POSES DELICATE PROBLEMS FOR US. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WILL NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF UK METHODS. IF DISCUSSIONS HELD ON BASIS OF IRAQ REQUIREMENT RAF WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN ADVISING ON INTEGRATED SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THEY HAVE INSUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE; ANY RESULTS WOULD BE OF LIMITED VALUE TO IRAQIS.
3. THE ONLY CENTRE WE MIGHT ALLOW ACCESS TO IS THE IACC UNIT AT WATTISHAM, BASED ON A NOMAD TYPE SYSTEM. THIS WAS VISITED BY SHENSHAL AND TEAM AND WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT WAS SAID THEN.
4. WE DO NOT WISH TO BE UNHELPFUL, BUT AS YOU WILL REALISE TECHNIQUES OF THE KIND REFERRED TO, UNRELATED TO HARDWARE ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE AND ARE NOT NORMALLY RELEASED TO OTHER COUNTRIES. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU WISH US TO GO ON WITH THIS EXERCISE - WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE ANY MORE INFORMATION THAN THEY HAVE ALREADY. IN VIEW OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION WE GAVE THEM ON AIR DEFENCE DURING SHENSHAL'S VISIT, WE WILL REQUIRE A MORE CONVINCING NEED TO KNOW THAN WE HAVE AT PRESENT.
5. RECOMMEND THAT IRAQIS SHOULD BE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH PLESSEY AND/OR MARCONI.

STEWART



# CYPHER

NES

NO DISSEMINATION

97

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO STOW 39 OF 12/12 CYPHER/CAT A UNIT 1 BANFORD  
ROUTINE

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
15 DEC 1969

NEQ 10/1

Regula  
Corylon Plant House  
MMA  
15/12

CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 39

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Mr. Hunschiff. Mun 4 (98)  
I can't imagine what  
prompted Ministers. to send off their  
rel. Phier may Mr MacLae  
but. Asong 1/12/69 pl.  
British Embassy

PARIS

10 December 1969

(6/7)

Dear Tripp.

French Military Aircraft for Iraq

I have sent you this evening a telegram (No. 1151) in answer to a somewhat bizarre enquiry from the Ministry of Technology in an un-numbered STOW telegram of December 4. This telegram asked us "without alerting the French" for an assessment of "activity and likely current French political view". It would have been entirely inappropriate in my view to send a reply direct to the Ministry of Technology on a subject of this sort. It was no less inappropriate for them to have addressed us such an enquiry on their own, but it may well be that you saw the telegram on its way to us. At all events we should like you to see the reply that we are sending.

Reply at f. 100  
p.a.  
Jan 18/12

Yours ever  
*P.H.R. Marshall*  
( P.H.R. Marshall )

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,

Near Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY PARIS TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM STOW U/N 10 DECEMBER 1969

/RECEIVED AS TELNO 1151 TO F.C.O. 10 DECEMBER 1969/

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TELEGRAM STOW U/N OF 4 DECEMBER: EXPORT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ.

THE BEST ASSESSMENT WE CAN MAKE IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) IN APRIL 1968 A CONTRACT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SIGNED FOR THE SALE OF FIFTY FOUR MIRAGES TO IRAQ, DELIVERY TO SPREAD OVER THREE YEARS STARTING AT THE END OF 1969.

(2) THE FRENCH HAVE MADE NO FORMAL PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO STOP THE DELIVERY OF THESE AIRCRAFT. THE EMBARGO PLACED ON THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO THE BELLIGERENTS AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR IN JUNE 1967 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELAXED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IRAQ WAS NO LONGER INCLUDED. NOR WAS IT MENTIONED BY PRESIDENT POMPIDOU WHEN RECOUNTING THE HISTORY OF THE EMBARGO AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LAST JULY.

(3) THE EMBARGO ON THE SUPPLY OF FIFTY MIRAGES TO ISRAEL SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE RAISED. FRENCH POLICY WAS RECENTLY RESTATED IN CAIRO BY M. BETTENCOURT. RUMOURS HAVE APPEARED THAT THESE MIGHT BE SWITCHED TO IRAQ, BUT HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY DENIED.

(4) BECAUSE OF THEIR EMBARGO ON ISRAEL, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT NEED TO CONSIDER THE WISDOM OF UPSETTING THE MIDDLE EAST 'BALANCE' BY ALLOWING THE AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED, WHEN (A) TENSION IS RISING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, WITH THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IMMINENT, (B) THE FOUR HAVE JUST BEGUN MEETING AGAIN TO TRY TO AGREE ON GUIDANCE TO JARRING. THEY MAY SEEK ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS OF POSTPONING DELIVERY, WITHOUT OF COURSE TELLING THE IRAQIS THE DEAL IS OFF. DIFFICULTIES MAY ALSO HAVE ARISEN ON THE IRAQI SIDE. (WHEN THE ORIGINAL DEAL WAS ABOUT TO BE SIGNED, THERE WERE REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS IN BAGHDAD, ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY, WERE UNHAPPY AT THE PRICE ASKED OF IRAQ, ONE MIRAGE COSTING ABOUT THE SAME AS THREE MIGS).

2. MUCH OF THIS IS SPECULATIVE BUT WITHOUT MAKING ENQUIRIES WE CANNOT BE MORE PRECISE.

/3. COPY

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- 2 -

3. COPY E.I.R.I.(A), MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY.

MR. PALLISER

/SENT TO MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

W.EUR.DEPT.

D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNNN



Mr. Tripp

I think an add should go.

9/15/12

French Military Aircraft for Iraq

Flag B

You asked for observations on Mr. Marshall's letter to you.

Flag C


2. I am afraid that I do not subscribe to Mr. Marshall's view that the Ministry of Technology's telegram was either bizarre or inappropriate.

Flag D

3. There has been correspondence between the Ministry of Technology and Baghdad about an alleged Iraqi desire to purchase the Anglo/French Jaguar. We have been watching developments closely and he urged the Ministry to pour cold water on both BAC and the air attaché, Baghdad who were eager to promote a sale of the modern sophisticated aircraft which for obvious political and security reasons we, HMG, could not agree to let the Iraqis have for very many years. Cold water was carefully and we hope conclusively poured via Stow telegram ~~nn~~numbered of 4 December, which was copied to Paris and which should have given our Embassy there enough background to grasp the reason for the perfectly proper questions in the ~~recent~~ Stow telegram which caused so much offence. What I think has happened is that Mr. Marshall had not seen the Stow telegram to Baghdad by the time he had drafted his letter to you, and here the Ministry of Technology was also at fault for not clearly tying the two telegrams together.

4. However, whether Mr. Marshall was aware of the recent telegram or not, I feel that the Ministry of Technology has a right to seek such information direct from Embassies abroad without necessarily proceeding through the FCO (both telegrams were copied to us and we had a hand in drafting the one to Baghdad). They have the job of selling British aircraft and should be free to seek information on factors, political and commercial which effect the prospects of such sales.

5. I do not feel that a reply to Mr. Marshall is necessarily called for but if you wish I will draft an anodine defence of Mintech's motives.



(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
12 December, 1969

pe. *Jan 18/12*



CONFIDENTIAL

100

Near Eastern Department,

16 December, 1969.

NEQ 10/1

French Military Aircraft for Iraq

Please refer to your letter 6/7 of 10 December.

2. I have seen your telegram No. 1151 which has been passed through us to the Ministry of Technology. You should by now have received Stow unnumbered of 4 December, addressed to Baghdad and copied to you, which gave some background to the other unnumbered Stow telegram of the same date which was the subject of your letter.
3. There has been some speculation here and in our Baghdad Embassy whether the Iraqis, on failing to obtain the Anglo/French Jaguar - in which they have shown a keen interest recently and which we do not want to let them have for obvious political and security reasons - would then ask the French to produce the 54 Mirages they contracted to supply in the agreement you mention in your telegram under reference. The Ministry of Technology's understanding is that the French, on their part, would, for purely commercial reasons, prefer to sell their own Mirage than their half-owned Jaguar.
4. The Ministry of Technology wanted your assessment of the latest state of play on French intentions. Hence the Stow telegram to which you refer and which, I can well imagine, would appear somewhat strange if viewed purely on its own. Ministry of Technology, who had discussed the topic with us, were at fault for not tying their two telegrams more closely together but this is a technical point, which, as I am sure you will agree, is not worth pursuing.

(J. P. TRIPP)

P. H. R. Marshall Esq.,  
PARIS.

per  
Jm  
18/12

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Registry  
No.

**DRAFT** letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

P.H.R. Marshall Esq.,  
PARIS

From

Mr. Tripp  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NED

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

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CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Mr. Smith*

*see minute below.*

*P.H.R. Marshall*

*16/12*



CONFIDENTIAL

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*[Handwritten signature]*  
16512

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



101


RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELNO STOW 44

16 DECEMBER 1969



RESTRICTED

FOR EIR. UNDERSTAND IRAQIS ARE AWAITING A QUOTATION  
FOR RAPIER. HAS IRAQ EMBASSY LONDON ASKED BAC FOR  
QUOTATION BECAUSE WE WERE NOT AWARE OF SUCH A REQUEST UNLESS  
GENERAL SHENSHAL ASKED FOR IT DURING HIS APRIL VISIT TO  
UK GRATEFUL ADVICE WHETHER BAC ARE SUBMITTING QUOTATION.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO MINTECH]

STOW DISTRIBUTION  
N.E.D.

*Discussed with Futh  
& PRMH.*

*Mintech will  
reply with a warning -  
off.*

RESTRICTED

*pa Jan 18/2*



L.H. 4DT



MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
EIR.1(a), Room 305,  
Stuart House, Soho Square, W.1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 01-437-9288 Ext. 106.  
Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex  
Telephone: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Our reference: AP/77/05  
Your reference:

15th January, 1969.

F.C.O.	- Mr. Crossthwait
M.O.D.	- Mr. Tallboys
Bd. of Trade	- Mr. Church
Treasury	- Mr. Barratt
Mintech.	- Mr. Sedgwick, AD/AP(B)

} Separate  
minutes.

3.00 p.m.

Lightnings for Iraq

... This is an advance copy of the paper that we have put forward for E.S.C.(O). It will be taken next Monday. We thought that you would like the extra time in which to consider its implications.

*I. W. Turnbull.*

*for* (C. B. Benjamin)

CONFIDENTIAL, covering SECRET



Supply of Lightning Aircraft to IraqNote by the Ministry of TechnologyBACKGROUND

1. The Iraq Government have asked the British Aircraft Corporation to start detailed contractual negotiations for the supply of 40 Lightnings (36 single-seater Mk. 53s and four two-seater trainer Mk. 53s). So far, the firm's proposals have been put forward without prejudice to B.A.C. approval to the supply of Lightnings in the event of the Iraqis confirming their intention to purchase, and B.A.C. now require clearance to pursue negotiations to a conclusion.

Value of Order

2. B.A.C.'s proposals, covering aircraft, armaments and initial spares, is worth £46m. To this would be added the value of other equipments necessary for operating the aircraft, e.g. simulators, special storage equipment, etc., which would bring the immediate value to more than £50m. With the normal supplies of spares, repair and overhaul work by B.A.C. and their subcontractors, the eventual value of the order would be in the region of £50-100m.

Delivery Timescale

3. The Lightning production line is now running down and the best delivery date that B.A.C. can offer for new aircraft is 24 months, with the full order for 40 aircraft completed in just over three years. There are signs, however, that the Iraqi Government has discussed with the Saudi Arabians the possibility of diverting some of the latter's aircraft, of which there will be about 20 surplus to their operating capacity for some 18 months, and if this were to happen Iraq could obtain some earlier Lightnings. But even on this basis, they could not expect to have effective numbers of trained pilots, maintenance staff and support facilities for at least 18 months.

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS

4. With work on the Lightning running out, the Iraq order represents probably one of the last opportunities for B.A.C. to secure a market for this aircraft, and hence keep the production line active for a reasonable period. Whilst B.A.C. are pursuing other sales possibilities in Argentina and Morocco, both are longer term prospects and depend upon the aircraft being in continuous production meanwhile. However, without immediate steps to lay down more aircraft, there will be no more Lightning production.



5  
On the positive side, an order for 40 Lightnings could keep the production line running for another three years and create some 4.6m. man hours of work, of which 30 per cent would go to sub-contractors, notably Rolls-Royce (East Kilbride) and Feranti (Birmingham). H.M.C. stands to gain directly from this new inflow of production work: overheads on all contracts with firms engaged in building the Lightning will be spread over the Iraqi order, but at B.A.C. alone, overheads on our contracts will be reduced by 10 per cent; for example, on our envisaged orders for the Jaguar the net reduction could save H.M.C. up to £2m. Moreover, with production throughout the Lightning systems in train again, spares required for the R.A.F. should be cheaper and more readily available. In the longer term, the retention of the labour force involved in the Lightning will ensure greater continuity of the necessary precision production skills in B.A.C. to work on other projects, notably the Jaguar and MCA.

6  
On the other hand, a failure to secure this order will leave the Preston Division of B.A.C. employed to only 60 per cent of the level necessary to maintain an efficient production unit, and immediately some 250 staff will be surplus. The firm will, therefore, bearing in mind the similar under-loading at Weybridge, have to undertake a drastic re-organisation of its production structure, which could well lead to substantial further redundancies. B.A.C. are themselves fully aware of the crucial importance of gaining an early order for more Lightnings, and, in order to keep their price and delivery terms as competitive as possible, have already invested nearly £130,000 in ordering long-dated materials.

#### EXPORT IMPLICATIONS

7  
Apart from the direct gain through the sale and subsequent support of the aircraft themselves, there will be other important side effects:-

##### (a) Other Lightning Customers

The enhanced prospects of gaining further orders for the Lightning once the production line becomes re-established has already been mentioned in the case of Argentina and Morocco. B.A.C.'s sales position will also be helped since at one time the French announced that they had secured the order in Iraq with the Mirage, and, although political factors have undoubtedly played their part, B.A.C. will be able to draw the maximum advantage from the fact that the Lightning has overhauled the Mirage.

Of special importance, however, is the opportunity that will be afforded for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to order further aircraft from an active production line. Both countries have ordered only the minimum numbers of aircraft to complement their squadrons and training organisations, and normal attrition is bound to generate a requirement for replacements. Without a production line on which to draw, these two customers would have to wait until 1972 at the earliest for further aircraft, and these could only be refurbished ones. B.A.C. are already facing this problem, since one of the Saudi aircraft crashed on flight trials, and, whilst B.A.C. have an obligation to make good this loss with a new aircraft, they could not economically  
/build



build "one-off": a further order would allow them to replace this lost aircraft at reasonable cost.

(b) Effect on Other Orders

Iraq is in discussion with a number of electronic firms about communications and radar equipment. A Lightning order would go a long way towards re-establishing our position in this market as a supplier of aero-space products generally, and put our firms in a better position to gain these orders. Iraq has also shown an interest in the Harrier, and we should similarly expect prospects of gaining orders for this aircraft, and possibly the Jaguar, to be improved. The same arguments apply to other potential customers for the Lightning once the aircraft is back in production.

MILITARY FACTORS

8. The Lightning is essentially an interceptor aircraft, but to widen the aircraft's market appeal, B.A.C. have added a limited ground attack capability. In their review of Arms Supplies to the Middle East on 15th November, 1967, (O/D(67) 36th Meeting), Ministers regarded the Lightning as among those equipments not essentially offensive in character whose supply could be continued.

9. In the case of Iraq, even though the strike capability of the Lightning is restricted, there is the possibility of it being employed in an Arab/Israeli confrontation or conceivably against Kuwait. But the Lightning in this role is a far less effective vehicle than the Iraqis could obtain either from the Russians or from the French, who are B.A.C.'s competitors for this order. Thus the chances are that Iraq's offensive capability will be greater if the Lightning is not ordered and French or Russian aircraft taken instead. Moreover, with the supply of the Lightning, we also retain the ability to control the supply of spares necessary to keep the aircraft operational.

10. The Iraqi Air Force are bound to require some form of R.A.F. assistance in the training of their pilots, and possibly other personnel. This may create problems, but in view of the rather greater professional development of the IAF, many of whom are ~~already~~ R.A.F.-trained already or gained their experience on Jet Provost and ~~Lightning~~, the problem should not be so serious as was the case with Saudi Arabia. It would be necessary, however, to give careful study to the IAF's needs for training at the same time as B.A.C. are undertaking their commercial negotiations in order to avoid as far as possible the confusions and delays that arose in Saudi Arabia.

POLITICAL FACTORS

11. The regime currently in power in Iraq is more favourably inclined to the West than its predecessor, and the present Minister of Defence, General Haidan Tukriti, in particular, has shown a clear disposition in the past to acquire British equipment and to ensure the continuation of the RAF-oriented procedures in the Iraqi Air Force. But in terms of Anglo-Iraqi relations, an order of this scale for the Lightning should be valuable in restoring good relations over the whole range of diplomatic and commercial contacts.



12. The new regime is also more favourably regarded by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: even for the Iraqis to suggest that they could get agreement from the Saudis to releasing some of the latter's Lightnings indicates that these countries must be on a closer relationship than for some time (indeed, reports from commercial sources indicate that the Saudis went out of their way to "sell" the Lightning to the Iraqis during General Fakhri's recent visit). If Iraq purchases the Lightning, they will have commonality of defence equipment with these two Arab States, who already operate the aircraft, which should be a factor to attract Iraq towards their more moderate policies. In these circumstances, the attitude of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to an Iraqi purchase of Lightnings should not be so critical now as it would have been when A.A.C. started their present round of negotiations last March, though any views about the Iraqi regime must be tempered by caution in view of the politically unstable situation in the country.

13. Other States in the area, such as Iran and Israel, are likely to be disturbed at the prospect of an order for Lightnings in spite of their own recent orders for U.S. Phantom aircraft. Furthermore, it could be pointed out that the Lightning is essentially a defensive aircraft and considerably less of a potential threat to them than alternative aircraft that the Iraqis could acquire from Russia or France; dependent as Iraq must be on us for spares to support these aircraft, we should hope to exercise a more moderating influence than would other possible suppliers; and through the commonality of equipment with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait we would hope that Iraq would adopt policies less extreme than in the past and more in keeping with the interests of her two neighbours.

14. A further point of some importance is that following on the Saudi order for Lightnings, this order will be particularly valuable in postponing the date when we have to tell them that they cannot procure any more new Lightnings because the line has closed. Such a disclosure now would be particularly ill-timed given the problems being encountered between U.K. firms and the Saudis over the Air Defence Scheme and could only exacerbate an already difficult situation. Similar considerations apply to Kuwait, except that, coming on top of the problems already encountered in obtaining additional Hunters because that production line too had closed, they could well lead to serious disenchantment with Britain as a source of supply for defence and other equipment.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

15. The aircraft would be the same as those already supplied to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, from which their most sensitive equipments have been deleted. Most of the armaments, i.e. Aden Guns, 2" SNEB rockets, and bombs, are clear of security restrictions. But when this proposal was previously considered, reference was also made to the security aspects of the Red Top system: with the passage of time, we are approaching the date (July, 1969) by which this system itself modified from the missiles employed in the A.A.P. - will be cleared for release of sufficient classified information to enable the Saudis not only to purchase the equipment but to be enabled to operate and maintain the weapon system. The Iraqis, however, are not likely to need such missiles for their aircraft for at least another year/eighteen months.

16. Whilst the association of Red Top with the order is a prerequisite to its being accepted by the Iraqis, in any event the production of Firestreak, the  
/only



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only possible alternative, has ceased, and the only weapon available to offer is Red Top. In these circumstances, there seems no alternative, if we are to gain this order for B.A.C. to be cleared to offer the Red Top system.

RECOMMENDATION

- 17 The Committee is invited to recommend to Ministers approval of B.A.C.'s proposals to supply to Iraq 36 Mk. 33 and 4 Mk. 33 Lightnings together with associated armament, equipment and spares.

Ministry of Technology,  
London, W.1.  
15th January, 1969

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Reg. Pa. + encl.

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Mr. Evans (Near Eastern Department)

R.E. 16/1.

Lightnings for Iraq

The Ministry of Technology have just informed us that they are putting to the E.S.C.(O) next Monday (20 January) a paper on the supply of Lightnings to Iraq. There is Cocom business also for discussion at the meeting and I understand Mr. Gallagher will represent the F.C.O.

2. The paper, an advance copy of which is attached, invites the Committee to recommend to Ministers the approval of proposals by B.A.C. to sell 40 Lightnings to Iraq, on the supply of which the Iraqi Government has asked B.A.C. to start detailed contractual negotiations. With associated equipment the order would be worth between £80 million and £100 million.

3. If the sale were made some R.A.F. assistance would be required both for pilot and technical training: and a prerequisite of the sale would be the supply of Red Top, the associated air-to-air missile system (due shortly to be released to Saudi Arabia).

4. Apart from the intrinsic value of the order which, as the paper points out, is badly needed by B.A.C., a sale to Iraq would enable the Lightning production line to be kept open, thus opening the way to further possible sales elsewhere, e.g. to Argentina.

5. We spoke and you agreed to brief Mr. Gallagher for the meeting. I understand that you will have to consult Ministers first.

*R. L. Crosthwait*

(R. L. Crosthwait)

16 January, 1969.

Defence Training & Supply Department  
(Main B: Extn. 1334)

c.c. Sir E. Peck  
Mr. Arthur  
Mr. Gallagher  
Mr. Sykes (Defence Policy Dept.)  
Arabian Dept.



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Reg. 10.

Mr. Gallagher

Lightnings for Iraq

Talking Points

FLAG A

The situation at present is set out in the Ministry of Technology Note.

The first sentence is misleading: the Iraq Government have not yet asked BAC to start negotiations, although it appears from BAC's information and from Baghdad telegram Stow 2 that the time is approaching when detailed proposals might be discussed.

FLAG B

2. The policy on the sale of arms to Iraq and the Arab countries is contained in OPD(67)78. The paper indicates that it is preferable to allow sales negotiations to take place without commitment rather than to encourage or prohibit such negotiations before the point is reached at which a definite offer can be made. BAC, and indeed all the major arms firms, are well aware of this policy and are accustomed to operating within it. We do not however regard the fact that negotiations have been taking place as an argument for approving a sale.

Flag C

3. At this stage it will be unwise to indicate to BAC that we will necessarily give permission now for a sale in the future. It does not in any case seem essential to do this; but neither is there any reason to object to the continuation of the present negotiations. In the changing and difficult conditions prevailing in revolutionary Iraq the risk exists that permission once given might have to be withdrawn if in fact the Ministry of Technology's hypothesis is wrong.

4. It is therefore recommended that you should tell the meeting that the time has not yet arrived when we will be justified in approaching Ministers to seek approval to a sale. It appears from the evidence which has so far been produced that the point at which a sales offer might be made is not yet in sight and that furthermore the suggestion that aircraft already in

/production

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production for Saudi Arabia might be diverted to Iraq as an inducement to them to make a quick proposal has not been confirmed. You might say, however, that if BAC were to produce further evidence that negotiations have reached the stage where Government approval is necessary, such approval would be quickly sought and the Ministry of Technology might also be asked to tell BAC that there is no objection to their continuing negotiations.

5. You may also wish to bring to the notice of the meeting that the political factors set out in the Ministry of Technology paper have not been agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and that we do not agree with some of the statements made therein. If pressed on political factors you might say, with reference to para. 11 of the Mintech Note, that the present regime in Iraq has shown little evidence of being more favourably inclined to the West than its predecessor, and with reference to para. 12 that for Iraq to have the same equipment as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait does not necessarily mean that their foreign policies will be the same.

Background

6. We have been regularly urged to give some indication of our attitude to a possible sale in the past but, guided by the OPD paper of November 1967, we have consistently said that in view of the changing situation in Iraq we could only give a decision when a request to purchase was actually made and that we would take into consideration the conditions existing at the time.

7. There have been indications that a somewhat optimistic picture has been painted in the past by the BAC representative in Iraq. There are grounds for believing that the Ministry of Technology share this optimism, which the evidence does not entirely support.



Copied to: Mr. Arthur  
Sir E. Peck  
Mr. Sykes  
Mr. McCarthy  
Mr. Moore



105

Regula

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Mr. Gallagher

Lightnings for Iraq

Defence Training and Supply Department have asked us to provide you direct with a brief.

2. Mr. Arthur and Defence Training and Supply Department have seen the brief and concur.

3. Baghdad telegram Stow 3 just received suggests that the case has indeed been overstated.

Flag D

*D. J. Makinson*

(D.J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Department.

17 January, 1969.

Mr. Makinson

Thank you for this helpful brief.

2. The discussion was a difficult one. The Ministry of Technology, supported by the Ministry of Defence, argued strongly that recent reports from Baghdad - and, in particular, telegram STOW No. 3 - suggested that the signature of a contract was imminent and that the time had therefore come to seek Ministerial approval for the sale of Lightnings. I said that the time had not yet arrived

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to/



2.

to approach Ministers and drew attention to OPD(67)78 and the decisions which Ministers had taken on this paper. I got absolutely no support. The Ministry of Technology quoted a decision taken by Ministers in 1968 on this specific contract in which they had said that the matter should be referred to them again as soon as negotiations between BAC and the Iraqi Government had crystallized. That stage had now been reached and, if the order was lost, Ministers would undoubtedly ask why they had not been consulted.

3. I pointed out that our latest information indicated that, while a technical decision had been taken to buy the Lightnings, there would still have to be a political decision and this was hardly likely until the COMET Mission had visited Iraq and the question of credit for this and other ~~details~~ <sup>details</sup> had been explored. On the political aspects, I made the points in paragraph 4 of the brief. I also said that the paper was defective in that it made no reference to the outstanding issues between the IPC and the Iraqi Government and the danger that the Iraqis might try to use the order for the Lightnings as a means of blackmailing us into persuading the IPC against their better commercial judgment to reach a settlement with the Iraqis on over-generous terms.

4. After further discussion, the best which I could secure was agreement that the paper should not be submitted to Ministers until after the outcome of the COMET Mission was known; and that meanwhile the paper should be amended to ensure that the political section reflected FCO views and that the point about the IPC was included.

5. I should therefore be grateful if you would discuss with Mr. Airey of the Ministry of Technology how the political section of the paper should be revised and if you would provide ~~me~~ <sup>him</sup> with a

short/





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3.

short paragraph about the IPC which Mr. Ellingworth of Oil

Department might be asked to <sup>draft</sup> ~~provide~~.

  
(F.G.K. Gallagher)  
21 January, 1969.  


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3. SUPPLY OF LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ

Neg. 106

The Committee had before them a note by the Ministry of Technology (ESC(0)(69) 2) proposing the supply to Iraq of 40 Lightning aircraft together with associated armaments, equipment and spares.

MR. AIREY said that over the years Iraq had shown varying degrees of interest in purchasing Lightnings. In April 1968, the Chairman of the Official Committee had recommended (ESC(68) 3) that Ministers should authorise the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) to continue negotiations with the Iraqis, and that Officials should resubmit the case for supply in full if the Iraqi interest crystallised. Since then, the Iraqis had sought to purchase similar aircraft from the French and Russians; but they had evidently not been offered satisfactory terms. They had recently shown renewed interest in purchasing Lightnings. They had also expressed their intention of discussing credit and trade requirements with the mission from the Council for Middle East Trade (COMET) which would shortly be visiting Baghdad. The order for Lightnings would be worth more than £50 million immediately and might rise to £100 million taking into account possible orders for spares and servicing. This was possibly one of the last opportunities for BAC to obtain a market for the Lightning which would

E. J. O'm  
ESC(0)(69) 1st  
Cabinet Official  
L. H. G. in Study in  
Expts attached  
by Mr. Galloway  
on 20 Jan 1969  
Other items  
related with  
Trade Policy Dept.



SECRET

justify keeping the production line open; without it, BAC would shortly need to reorganise their production structure and lay men off. The Lightning was not essentially an offensive aircraft and was already being supplied to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Previous experience with aircraft sales in the Middle East suggested that if the Iraqis needed to buy, we should need to be in a position to give approval at very short notice. BAC had accordingly asked for early authority to pursue their current negotiations to a conclusion. From the evidence available to the Ministry of Technology, he considered that the Iraqis had probably now reached a decision in favour of purchasing Lightnings, if their delivery, credit and other requirements could be met; and that Ministers should be urgently advised to authorise supply.

MR. GALLAGHER said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would be unable to agree to the paper going forward to Ministers in its present form. They doubted whether the Iraqis would decide to purchase Lightnings before they had fully explored the prospects for obtaining satisfactory long-term credit, and for concluding trade agreements following the COMET mission. The political situation in the Middle East was volatile and there was a risk that if the circumstances changed Ministers would find it necessary to reconsider or even reverse any immediate decision to supply Lightnings, he would prefer that BAC should continue negotiations without commitment and that Ministers should take a decision when the Iraqis' intention to purchase was clearer. The decision would largely depend on the trade and credit terms required by the Iraqis, and on the Iraq Government's present behaviour towards the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which could have important consequences for our oil interests in the Middle East.

In discussion, it was argued that if BAC were not put in a position to clinch any deal without delay, we risked losing the order, with serious consequences for industry and employment. A decision was also needed now in case the Iraqis asked for training courses and other technical assistance in preparing their Air Force for operating Lightning aircraft, or for guarantees that spare parts would be supplied; Saudi Arabia had asked for similar assurances before committing themselves to purchase. If we did not supply Lightnings, the Iraqis might purchase other aircraft of greater offensive capability. On the other hand, it was argued that the Iraqis intended that the purchase of Lightnings should form part of a package deal on trade matters, and that we should need to know what else the package might contain before reaching a final decision. Our attitude towards the sale of these aircraft and especially on credit terms could not be determined in isolation from the Iraqis' pressure for increased payments from the IPC. The proposal raised important political questions which should be worked out more fully before presentation to Ministers.

-6-  
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THE CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Committee agreed that although the proposal to supply Lightning aircraft to Iraq required further consideration, it would be desirable to bring all these issues to Ministers' attention as soon as possible. ESC(0)(69) 2 should accordingly be revised to take account of the points made during discussion and should be resubmitted to the Official Committee for their consideration. Meanwhile, B.C should continue their discussions with the Iraqis but without any commitment on their part.

The Committee -

- (1) Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.
- (2) Invited the Ministry of Technology, in consultation with the Treasury, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Board of Trade, and the Department of Economic Affairs, to amend ESC(0)(69) 2 to take account of the points made in discussion, and to circulate the revised paper to the Official Committee on Strategic Exports for consideration at a future meeting.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

22nd January 1969



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Regopa

Mr. Makinson (NED)

We spoke.

I attach the suggested  
draft piece in IPC in the  
paper in the Lightnings.

~~J. L. L.~~

~~(Oil) 27/1~~

Regy. (Ruth)

Phone speak.

Jan 13/12



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Any deal would be jeopardised, even nullified, if the Iraqis sought to make it conditional on a settlement (by definition on Iraqi terms) of the long-standing and complex dispute between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Although the IPC is a British-registered company and contains substantial British interests (about one quarter of the shareholding is held by British Petroleum and a similar amount by Shell), there are <sup>equally</sup> large foreign interests (about one quarter French and a similar amount American). Her Majesty's Government, even if they considered it politic to seek to dictate policy to a commercial concern of this kind, would, in view of the IPC's composition, be by no means confident of getting their way ~~and~~ and would in the process run an almost certain risk of seriously upsetting the particularly friendly governments of the US and the Netherlands. <sup>Future</sup> ~~In any case~~, any pressure brought to bear by HMG on IPC to settle with the Iraqis on terms which the latter would like imposed, would have repercussions in other oil countries to the serious detriment of our (in total) much greater interests there.

It is perhaps unlikely that the Iraqis would make such a settlement of the IPC dispute a prior condition of a deal over Lightnings. They might very well, however, at some later stage - for example when BAC had committed their production lines and employment <sup>plans</sup> ~~prospects~~ to the Iraqi order - take the line that payment would only be possible

/if

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if the IPC were to cough up, without quid pro quo,  
the tens of millions of pounds which the Iraqis  
claim to be 'due' to them. Such a gambit, which  
would be consonant with the character of some of  
the leading members of the present Iraqi regime,  
would put HMG and BAC into a difficult, if not  
intolerable, position.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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**LAST PAPER**

EQ 10/3

Copy  
EQ 10/1

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 460 OF 10 OCTOBER RPTD FOR INFO TO  
BAGHDAD AND SAVING TO SAHRAIN.

BAGHDAD TEL NO. 230: ARMS FOR IRAQ.

*This paper has been  
given Arms Working Party  
distribution*

I CALLED YESTERDAY ON THE AMIR, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR. ALL KNEW OF MY RECENT VISIT  
TO BAGHDAD, AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET THEM TO TALK ABOUT  
ANYTHING ELSE.

2. SHEIKH SA'AD RAISED THE ONLY POINT OF REAL INTEREST.

HE ASKED ME STRAIGHT OUT WHETHER GENERAL TAKRITI WAS SEEKING  
BRITISH EQUIPMENT FOR THE IRAQI FORCES. I REPLIED THAT  
TAKRITI HAD INDEED SPOKEN TO MR. EVANS AND MYSELF ABOUT THE  
POSSIBILITY OF BUYING BRITISH AIRCRAFT AND ARMoured VEHICLES,  
BUT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS,  
AND I THOUGHT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THEY WOULD DO  
SO. I ADDED THAT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION IN RETURN:  
WHAT WOULD THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT THINK IF WE DID SUPPLY  
LIGHTNINGS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO IRAQ? SHEIKH SA'AD REPLIED  
IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A SALE: IT WOULD HELP  
TO REDUCE IRAQ'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WOULD  
BE A GOOD THING FOR ALL OF US.

**LAST PAPER**

3. I WAS RATHER SURPRISED AT SO READY AN ANSWER FROM THE  
KUWAIT MINISTER OF DEFENCE. I REGARD BOTH HIS QUESTION AND HIS  
ANSWER AS EVIDENCE THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE ALREADY AWARE  
OF GENERAL TAKRITI'S IDEAS: THEY CERTAINLY SEEM TO REGARD HIM  
AS OUR MAN IN THE PRESENT IRAQ GOVERNMENT. I DO NOT KNOW



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2.

WHETHER THE AMIR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT SHARE  
SHEIKH SA'AD'S VIEWS ON ARMS SEMI COLON BUT HE IS AFTER ALL  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO BEAR  
HIS ASSURANCE IN MIND IF THE IRAQIS DO ASK US FOR LIGHTNINGS  
OR OTHER EQUIPMENT.

FO PASS BAGHDAD

MR. ARTHUR

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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Sale Of British And French Military Aircraft To Iraq. Sale Of Aircraft And Equipment To Iraq. 22 Jan. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/888. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107455955/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=9691c5e1&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107455955/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=9691c5e1&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.